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 Background: A concern of the Maryland Global Budget Revenue (GBR) program is that its cost-
containment financial incentive introduces a risk of hospitals seeking to avoid costly patient encounters.  
 Objective: The goal of this research was to assess the impact of the Maryland GBR program for 
evidence of unintended consequences. 
 Methods: This work includes three studies, two of which use econometric models to estimate the 
association of the Maryland GBR program with two outcomes conceptualized as potential spillover 
effects: probability of elective admission and emergency medical services (EMS) transport times. 
Difference-in-differences analyses were used to compare Maryland hospitals (Aim 1) and Maryland 
hospital service areas (Aim 3) to inverse probability of treatment weighted out-of-state comparators before 
and after GBR implementation. Maryland simultaneously implemented its GBR program and expanded 
Medicaid, so comparator states were selected that expanded Medicaid the same day as Maryland. The 
third study (Aim 2) is a descriptive analysis of annual changes in interhospital transfers comparing rural to 
urban hospitals before and after policy implementation. 
 Results: I found that the Maryland GBR program was associated a 5.2% (P =.004) increase in 
elective admissions among Medicaid and a 7.9% (P =.032) decrease among self-pay groups. Analysis of 
EMS transport times found an association between the Maryland GBR program and an increase in EMS 
transport times for cardiac arrest patients, but sensitivity analysis results suggest these effects could be 
confounded by changes in EMS agency reporting patterns. Finally, descriptive analyses of interhospital 
transfers showed that rural and urban hospitals experienced opposite trends in transfers in from other 
hospitals with the state’s two AMCs experiencing substantial decreases in transfers in following policy 
implementation.  
iv 
Conclusions: These three studies provide some evidence that there are unintended effects of the 
Maryland GBR program not previously considered. This work demonstrates a potential dual Medicaid-
expansion/GBR program effect with changes in probability of elective admission limited to the two payer 
groups most affected by Medicaid expansion. Regarding transfers in, rural hospitals were differentially 
affected compared to urban hospitals, and the two AMCs experienced an unintended reduction despite 
the state intervening to incentivize the opposite result.  
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In 2014, Maryland transformed how hospitals within the state were paid by all payers. Maryland 
replaced a fee-for-service model—where the provision of more services generated more revenue—with a 
global budget revenue (GBR) model that capped the total amount hospitals could charge to all payers. To 
date, there has been little focus on the potential unintended consequences of the Maryland GBR 
program’s replacement of a volume-based incentive with a cost-containment incentive, especially for 
vulnerable populations. The realignment of payment incentives and care delivery has the potential to 
improve quality and reduce costs. However, removal of a volume incentive may encourage service 
avoidance practices that may differentially affect vulnerable subgroups. The goal of this research was to 
determine if the Maryland GBR program resulted in unintended consequences, especially for two 
vulnerable groups—rural residents and patients seeking emergency services. This study is organized into 
three distinct research aims: 
Aim 1: Assess the association of the Maryland GBR program and the probability of elective 
admission and determine if there was a differential treatment effect for rural residing patients. 
  
Using the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) Nationwide Inpatient Sample and 
Maryland State Inpatient Databases for years 2011-2016, I conducted inverse probability of treatment 
weighted difference-in-differences analyses to estimate the probability of elective vs. non-elective 
admission conditional on admission before and after the Maryland GBR program comparing Maryland 
treatment hospitals to New York hospitals. Subgroup analyses were used to assess changes among 
payer groups and rural status of patients.  
Years two and three post implementation were associated with a 5.2% (P =.004) and 7.8% (P<.001) 
increase among Medicaid patients and a 7.9% (P =.032) and a 9.7% (P =.048) decrease among self-pay 
patients in the conditional probability of elective admission to Maryland compared to New York hospitals. 
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Examination of rural and non-rural sub-groups found no change in conditional probability of elective 
admission among rural residing patients. 
Aim 2: Describe changes in interhospital transfers and measures of capacity comparing changes 
among rural compared to urban hospitals before and after the Maryland GBR program.  
 
Using data from the 2010-2017 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) impact files and 
2012-2017 HCUP Maryland State Inpatient Databases, I conducted a descriptive comparison of 
interhospital transfers, average daily census (ADC), and number of staffed beds before and after the 
Maryland GBR program for rural and urban hospitals. Rural and urban hospitals experienced opposite 
trends in transfers in from other acute care hospitals following policy implementation with both groups 
deviating from pre-policy trends. Urban hospitals experienced an unexpected decline particularly among 
the state’s two academic medical centers (AMCs) while rural hospitals experienced an unexpected 
increase in transfers in. Conversely, rural and urban hospitals both experienced an unexpected drop in 
the number of transfers out in the second year following policy implementation. ADC and the number of 
staffed beds declined among both rural and urban hospitals following policy implementation. An exception 
was the state’s two academic centers which both experienced an increase in ADC following policy 
implementation. 
Aim 3: To assess the association of Maryland GBR program and Emergency Medical Services 
(EMS) transport times for 9-1-1 calls. 
 
Hypothesis 1: An increase in ambulance diversion under the Maryland GBR program resulted in an 
increase in EMS transport times.  
Using data from the 2011-2017 National EMS Information System (NEMSIS) database, inverse 
probability of treatment weighted difference-in-differences analyses were used to compare EMS transport 
times among all adults and among adults experiencing cardiac arrests in Maryland hospital service areas 
(HSAs) to similar out-of-state hospital service areas before and after program implementation. Maryland 
GBR was not significantly associated with a change in mean EMS transport times among adult EMS 
activations. Among adults experiencing cardiac arrest, the Maryland Global Budget program was 
associated with a 0.80-minute increase (P = .022) in mean EMS transport times in year one representing 
an 8.09 percent increase from a baseline of 8.91 minutes. However, when excluding HSAs with 
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significant year-over-year increases in 9-1-1 calls—increases associated with EMS agencies initiating 
reporting during the study period—this association diminished and was no longer significant. 
These studies provide evidence that there are spillover effects of the Maryland GBR program not 
previously considered. Specifically, rural residents and rural hospitals were differentially affected 
compared to their urban counter parts. Further trends in inter-hospital transfers trended in an unintended 
direction following the Maryland GBR program implementation for the states two AMCs. Additionally, the 
results in Aim 1 suggest there may be some kind of dual Medicaid-expansion/GBR policy effect on the 









CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Global budgets are a population-based payment model—one of the most transformative of the U.S 
Department of Health and Human Services alternative payment models. This model replaces a volume-
based financial incentive in fee-for-service reimbursement models with a cost-containment incentive.1,2 
The Department of Health and Human Services continues to accelerate their adoption and dissemination 
of this payment model—a model that prospectively sets the maximum revenue a hospital can charge in a 
set time period, typically a year.3 Global budgets have been adopted in various settings including in 
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Vermont4,5 and are being considered as a payment mechanism in recent 
healthcare reform proposals put forth by members of the U.S. Congress.6 Further, global budgets offer 
financial stability for hospitals providing prospective revenue budgets guarding against revenue volatility 
that has been associated with rural hospital closures.5  
In 2014, Maryland instituted the first and only state-wide, all-payer global budget model. The 
Maryland Global Budget Revenue (GBR) program transformed how hospitals achieve profits and incur 
losses by replacing their fee-for-service payment model with a global budget model for all non-federal 
acute care hospitals in the state. Previously, each new patient encounter such as inpatient admissions, 
emergency department visits, or observation stays generated revenue so long as the hospital could 
collect on the charges and the encounter did not qualify as a penalizable avoidable utilization.7 Under the 
Maryland GBR program, a hospital’s total annual revenue for all hospital-based services across all payers 
is predetermined by a base year’s total revenue with post hoc adjustments made to correct for market 
shifts and penalties if they do not achieve their target quality metrics.8,9  
The realignment of payment incentives and care delivery under global budgets has the potential 
to improve quality and reduce costs of care. However, removing a volume incentive and instead requiring 
hospitals to keep their costs below predetermined revenue budgets to achieve favorable profit margins 
introduces the risk that providers will avoid patient encounters. Analysis of the Maryland GBR program 
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can offer insights into a broad reaching application of global budgets. The existing literature on the 
Maryland GBR program provides some evidence of an association of the policy with volume avoidance. 
For example, the Maryland GBR program has been found to be associated with fewer inpatient 
admissions and fewer transfers between acute care hospitals.10,11 While decreases in inpatient 
admissions or interhospital transfers are not inherently negative outcomes, further research is needed to 
better understand if these changes present unintended consequences for patients, particularly for 
patients’ access to services. The objective of this study was to assess changes in service delivery 
associated with the Maryland GBR program that may indicate service avoidance and result in potential 
unintended consequences for patients’ access to services.  
 
Related Literature 
Maryland All-Payer and GBR Innovations  
Maryland is the only all-payer state in the nation, an exemption from the Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services (CMS) Inpatient Prospective Payment System implemented in the 1970’s. In Maryland, 
hospital rates are set and disclosed by the Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission 
(HSCRC)—a regulatory body formed by Maryland’s Medicare waiver.12 Under the waiver, Maryland 
instituted an All-Payer model where all payers—public and private—pay the same rates for hospital 
services. This model eliminated cost shifting among payers and limited the growth of per-admission costs. 
Under its All-Payer model Maryland decreased its cost per hospital admission from 26% above the 
national average in 1976 to 2% below in 2007.12 However, rate regulation did not have a lever to control 
total cost growth. Resultingly, Maryland volume growth outpaced national averages at 2.7% from 2001 to 
2007 compared to 1% nationally resulting in higher total hospital revenue.12  
Maryland proposed a global budget model with the goal of aligning incentives to control total cost 
growth. Built on the state’s All-Payer model, the Maryland GBR program enabled a broad application of 
global budgets in the hospital setting where all payers were required to participate.13-15 Global budgets 
were first piloted in Maryland in eight rural acute care hospitals in 2010 under a program called Total 
Patient Revenue, and then in 2014, Maryland expanded implementation to the remaining 36 hospitals in 
the state under its GBR program.10,11  
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 The Maryland GBR program prospectively sets hospitals’ total annual revenue authority—the 
maximum total amount charged to all payers for all services in a year.8,12 Budgets are prospectively set by 
hospitals, allowing for a maximum annual inflation growth of 3.58% based on a base revenue year.8 Ex-
post adjustments to budgets are made based on: changes in population growth or population 
demographics (e.g., age), meeting quality and performance metrics, exogenous utilization changes, and 
market shifts.7 The HSCRC recognized that exactly hitting projected hospital volume targets would be 
difficult, so the HSCRC regulations permit hospitals to adjust their service rates throughout the year, 
allowing for hospitals to vary their charges from the approved rates by plus or minus 5 percent without 
permission and up to 10 percent with permission from the HSCRC.10 The HSCRC requires that these 
price adjustments be uniformly applied to all services. GBR’s quality and program improvement programs 
were largely retained from the Maryland all-payer models.7 Maryland’s quality and performance 
improvement programs determine each hospital’s payment adjustments and create incentives for 
hospitals to improve performance on measures for patient experience, potentially avoidable utilization and 
conditions, patient safety indicators and complications, and mortality.7,10  
Financial Mechanisms of Global Budgets 
Under Maryland’s GBR program, hospital revenue is not generated by service use, but rather, by 
responsibility for the care of patients for a set period of time—removing the volume-based incentive.1,2 
There is a profound difference in how profits and losses occur between global budgets and fee-for-
service. The financial incentives of fee-for-service and global budgets are compared in Figure 1. Under 
both models, total costs (TC) —fixed costs (FC) plus variable costs (VC)—are driven by volume, where 
greater service volumes result in higher total costs. However, the revenue lines, which determine how 
profits and losses are realized, differ between the two systems. Under fee-for-service, the revenue line 
starts at the origin and has a positive slope. At zero volume, the provider realizes zero revenue. At any 
positive volume, greater volume results in higher revenue. Whereas, in a global budget model, the 
revenue line is horizontal, meaning revenues are constant across all levels of volume. In each graph, 
breakeven occurs when revenues equal total costs. 
For fee-for-service, all volumes to the left of breakeven produce a loss for the provider, while all 
volumes to the right of breakeven produce a profit. Thus, the incentive for providers is to raise utilization 
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because increased volume leads to greater profits. The graph of global budget costs and revenues 
(Figure 1) shows that all volume levels to the left of breakeven produce a profit, whereas all volumes to 
the right of breakeven result in a loss. Under global budgets, providers have an incentive to decrease 
utilization because lower volume leads to higher profits. Though given the limited range in price increase 
(5-10 percent) allowed by the HSCRC and adjustments for market share shifts, hospitals are not 
incentivized to drastically reduce volumes.  
Changes in Inpatient Admissions Under the Maryland GBR Program 
There is some evidence that the Maryland GBR program is associated with a reduction in inpatient 
volumes. One study found that the rate of inpatient admissions for Medicare beneficiaries and commercial 
plan members declined relative to an out-of-state comparison group.10 The same study found an increase 
in the rate of emergency department (ED) visits and observation stays for Medicare beneficiaries in 
Maryland compared to an out-of-state comparison group while there was a relative decrease for the 
commercially insured population. Another study used two different sets of assumptions regarding pre-
intervention trends to test for changes in inpatient admission rates among Medicare beneficiaries. Only 
when assuming pre-intervention trends differed between Maryland and out-of-state comparators was 
there a statistically significant reduction in admissions observed.11 The authors of the second study 
caution interpretation of these findings given violation of methodological assumptions when there are 
different pre-intervention trends. A study of the 2010 GBR implementation in eight rural Maryland 
hospitals also found no change in inpatient admissions, observation stays and ED visits.16  
A possible explanation for a decrease in inpatient admissions is a decrease in unplanned 
readmissions. However, the current evidence suggests that Maryland did not experience differential 
change in unplanned readmission rates.10 This is not surprising given a rich body of literature 
demonstrating the complexity of contributing factors and costliness of addressing the problem of 
unplanned readmissions.17-20 Additionally, reducing unplanned readmissions was a quality-based 
reimbursement metric prior to the implementation of the Maryland GBR program, which may have limited 
the opportunity to improve. The existing studies examining the Maryland GBR program analyze changes 
in admissions, ED visits, and observation stays, but there are no studies that examine changes in the mix 
of elective (scheduled) to non-elective admissions.  
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There are a number of possible reasons for changes in the mix of elective admissions. One 
hypothesis is that hospitals would have more control over limiting growth in elective admissions because 
they are scheduled and a second hypothesis is that hospitals would substitute elective for non-elective 
admissions. Limiting growth in elective admissions could be a way hospitals sustain or improve 
profitability under a global budget model. Under the Maryland GBR program, elective admissions are 
volumes that could be avoided or even shifted to other settings. For example, hospitals could shift 
elective ambulatory surgeries to non-regulated (non-hospital based) sites. While a lower probability of 
elective admission may indicate improving the value of care, it could also result in less timely access to 
clinically indicated services or greater wait times for patients. This is particularly important to understand 
for vulnerable populations, such as rural residents who already face access to care barriers.21,22 
An alternative hypothesis is that if elective admissions are less costly compared to non-elective 
admissions, then hospitals would have the incentive to admit elective patients and this may leave fewer 
beds for non-elective admissions. Lack of inpatient bed capacity has been well established as a major 
contributing factor to ED crowding and ambulance diversion.23,24 Patients awaiting admission in hospital 
EDs directly compete for beds with elective admissions. Allowing elective admissions to occupy a greater 
proportion of hospital beds could be detrimental to patients in the ED if their care is delayed.  
Emergency Department Crowding and Ambulance Diversion  
 Another potentially consequential yet unstudied area of the Maryland GBR program is the 
policy’s effect on hospitals’ use of ambulance diversion and emergency medical services (EMS). 
Ambulance diversion is a common, yet controversial method used by EDs to alleviate ED crowding.25 The 
guiding principle of ambulance diversion is to divert ambulances to other EDs when an ED is overly 
crowded to maintain the safety of patients already in the ED and of those seeking access via 
ambulance.26 However, an ethical dilemma arises when hospitals are held accountable for the safety of 
their own ED patients but not for those traveling by ambulance requesting ED access. The Maryland GBR 
program potentially deepens this dilemma by reversing hospitals’ volume incentive making volume 
avoidance, and ipso facto ambulance diversion, financially favorable.  
There is evidence that the incidence of ambulance diversion increased after implementation of the 
Maryland GBR program while total ED visits and admissions from the ED decreased in Maryland.27 These 
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trends are consistent with a growing body of literature that suggest a significant driver of ED crowding and 
thus use of ambulance diversion is an “upstream” bottleneck in the hospital—the availability of inpatient 
beds for patients awaiting admission in the ED.23,24,28-31 If the Maryland GBR program reverses the 
incentive for maximizing availability of inpatient beds, a potential effect is downstream boluses of patients 
incurring the negative consequences of crowding and service delays. Crowded EDs and the increase in 
ambulance diversions could potentially increase ambulance transport times which can be particularly 
harmful for patients experiencing time-sensitive conditions such an acute myocardial infaction.32-34 To 
date, no studies have analyzed the Maryland GBR program’s effect on ambulance transport times.  
Interhospital Transfers 
Similar to ambulance diversions, transferring patients to other hospitals is a method that hospitals 
can use to alleviate constrained inpatient capacity and/or ED crowding. Hospitals experiencing ED 
crowding or hospitals without inpatient capacity could transfer patients to other hospitals as a way of 
alleviating strained capacity while maintaining patient care quality standards. However, interhospital 
transfer exposes patients to known risks of discontinuity of care,35 increases resource utilization,36,37 and 
potentially results in worse outcomes for transferred compared to non-transferred patients.38  
There is some evidence that there was a decrease in interhospital transfers under the Maryland GBR 
program. One study found the Maryland GBR program was associated with a 25.2% greater decease in 
interhospital transfers compared to an out-of-state compare group. 39 The same study also found that 
there was no change in interhospital transfers among patients classified as major or extreme severity.39 
While it seems as if the sickest of patients were unaffected, this decrease could still be concerning given 
the HSCRC made provisions to better incentivize the acceptance of transfers from other acute hospitals 
to the state’s two academic medical centers (AMCs): The University of Maryland Medical Center and the 
Johns Hopkins Hospital.40 Understanding the disincentive global budgets provides hospitals to accept 
transfers into their hospital, the HSCRC wanted to help preserve capacity and incentive transfers into the 
two academic centers for patients who needed services not provided at their current hospital. 
Changes in interhospital transfers could be particularly harmful to patients in rural hospitals needing 
transfer to a referral hospital to receive a higher level of care than what can be provided in rural hospitals. 
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Understanding interhospital transfers among rural and urban hospitals could provide insights into whether 
rural hospitals were differentially affected.  
 
Significance, Contribution, and Innovation 
 
 The Maryland GBR program is the broadest application of global budgets results from which have 
been cited as support for adopting global budgets in new settings including in Pennsylvania and 
Vermont.4,5 Additional, the Maryland GBR program’s success has made global budgets an attractive 
payment mechanism for national healthcare reform proposals put forth by Members of the U.S. 
Congress.6 Further, global budgets in general are viewed as a solution to prevent rural hospital closure by 
providing financial stability.5 The spread of this payment model demands understanding of potential 
unintended consequences incurred by removing a volume incentive.   
Maryland’s GBR program provides a unique opportunity to study how hospitals respond to a 
population-based payment model. Maryland’s All-Payer setting closely represents national markets by 
including all payers, thus analysis of global budgets in this setting can provide critical insights for a 
potential national implementation. It remains uncertain how the Maryland GBR program’s replacement of 
a volume-based incentive with a cost containment incentive affected elective admissions, EMS transport 
times, and interhospital transport. Change in the mix of elective to non-elective admissions may indicate 
improving the value of care, but could also result in less access to clinically indicated procedures. This is 
particularly important to understand for rural residents who already face access-to-care barriers.21,22 
Additionally, removing the volume-based incentive could encourage use of ambulance diversion and 
discourage interhospital transfers. Yet, to my knowledge no studies to date have examined the Maryland 
GBR program’s effect on elective admissions, EMS transport times, or interhospital transport at the 
hospital level. 
The proposed research offers novel insight into an understudied population-based reimbursement 
model in an all-payer setting. This study sought to take advantage of this unique policy application to 
consider unintended consequences of global budgets with a focus on rural residents and rural hospitals. 
The results of this study provide a more complete understanding of hospitals’ responses to the Maryland 
 
11 
GBR program by being the first to analyze GBR’s effect on elective admissions, ambulance transport 




The conceptual approach for this study is informed by the theory of value-based payment 
incentives—a conceptual framework that draws on agency theory and behavioral economics.41 The basic 
assumption in this model is that a healthcare organization’s objective function is to maximize a 
combination of net income and patient health benefit, where both are a function of quantity and quality of 
services. The Maryland GBR program’s inversion of the relationship between quantity and profit requires 
hospitals to constrain either their variable or fixed costs to achieve a favorable net revenue. This implies 
that as hospitals move from a favorable toward a less favorable net revenue under GBR they may pursue 
volume avoidance, specifically avoidance of volumes that had minimal-to-no negative impact on care 




The objective of this study is to better understand the impact of the Maryland GBR program by 
considering unintended consequences of shifting hospital financial incentives to a cost containment 
model in a broad setting. With a particular focus on rural patients and rural hospitals, this study provides 
empirical estimates for the Maryland GBR program’s association with elective inpatient use with subgroup 
analyses on rural vs. non-rural residents and patients’ payer groups (Aim 1) and ambulance transport 
times for adult patients with a subgroup analysis on adults experiencing cardiac arrest (Aim 3), and a 
descriptive analysis comparing change in interhospital transfers and measures of capacity among rural 
compared to urban hospitals (Aim 2). 
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Figure 1. Profit and losses under fee-for-service and the Maryland GBR program.
Image adapted from Exhibit 3.1 in GH Pink and PA Song, Understanding 









CHAPTER 2: ASSOCIATION OF THE MARYLAND GLOBAL BUDGET REVENUE PROGRAM AND 
ELECTIVE HOSPITAL ADMISSION 
Overview 
Importance: The Maryland Global Budget Revenue (GBR) program is one of the most transformative 
alternative payment reforms and is being considered by policy makers as a funding mechanism in 
additional settings. Though little is known about its effects on mix of elective to non-elective admissions. 
Objectives: The primary objectives were to assess the association of the Maryland GBR program 
with the probability of elective admission and determine if there was a differential effect for rural residing 
patients. The secondary objective was to assess treatment effect among patients’ payer groups.  
Design, Setting, and Study Population: Observational study analyzing inpatient admission data from 
the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project Statewide Inpatient Databases for Maryland and New York. 
Inverse probability of treatment weighted difference-in-differences analyses were used to compare 
admissions to Maryland GBR program hospitals with admissions to hospitals in New York. 
Exposure: Maryland GBR program implementation in 2014 
Main Outcomes and Measures: Probability of elective admission conditional on having an admission 
Results: The sample included 9.4 million admissions to 31 Maryland treatment and 88 New York 
control hospitals between 2012 and 2016. Years two and three of program implementation were 
associated with a 5.2% (P =.004) and 7.8% (p<.001) increase, respectively, among Medicaid patients and 
a 7.9% (P =.032) and 9.7% (P =.048) decrease, respectively, among self-pay patients in the conditional 
probability of elective admission to Maryland compared to New York hospitals. Examination of rural and 
non-rural sub-groups found no change in conditional probability of elective admission among rural 
residing patients.  
Conclusions and Relevance: The Maryland GBR program was associated with changes in the mix of 
elective to non-elective admissions in the patient payer groups most likely affected by expansion of 
Medicaid. This potential dual policy effect may provide better access to elective services for newly insured 
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The Maryland Global Budget Revenue (GBR) program is arguably the most transformative and 
broad application of an alternative payment model to disrupt the longstanding relationship between 
service volume and revenue characteristic of healthcare delivery in the United States. Maryland’s 
application of global budgets has continued to draw the attention of policy makers, particularly as a 
potential solution for providing financial stability to rural hospitals where the volatility of revenue can 
threaten closure,5,42 and as a funding mechanism in national health reform proposals.6 Though there has 
been less attention paid to the potential spillover effects of replacing a volume-based incentive with a cost 
containment incentive.  
Under the Maryland GBR program, hospitals’ annual revenue is not generated by service use, but 
rather, is fixed to encourage hospitals to eliminate unnecessary hospital-based care.8,12 The Maryland 
GBR program was designed to limit admission volume growth and costs per admission.10,39 There is 
mixed evidence regarding the program’s effect on hospital service use. The Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services (CMS)-funded evaluation of the first four years of the program found a decline in 
inpatient admissions among Medicare beneficiaries and commercial plan members, an increase in 
emergency department (ED) visits and observation admissions among Medicare beneficiaries, and a 
decrease in ED and observation admissions among commercial plan members.10,39 Another study of the 
first two years of the program found no consistent evidence that the program was associated with 
changes in ED visits or observation and inpatient admissions among fee-for-service Medicare 
beneficiaries.11  
One of the clearest incentives of GBR is to reduce the number of admissions that the global 
budget must cover. Reducing the volume of admissions is an important approach to reducing hospitals’ 
variable costs.43 However, there have been no studies that examine change in the number of elective 
(scheduled) versus non-elective admissions after GBR. In other words, it is unknown whether the 
Maryland GBR program affects the mix of elective and non-elective admissions. 
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One reason why the mix may change is that elective admissions are scheduled and therefore 
easier to control compared to non-elective admissions that typically arrive through the emergency 
department. Therefore, one hypothesis is that hospitals reduce costs by decreasing elective admissions, 
and the ratio of elective to total admissions is lower after GBR. This is consistent with a study of GBR in 
Oregon that found significant reductions in both the non-elective and elective rate of admissions, but 
larger reductions among elective admissions.44 However, elective admissions have lower average costs 
than non-elective admissions. One study found that a modest reduction in the proportion of emergent 
procedures for 3 conditions was estimated to save nearly $1 billion over 10 years.45 Therefore, an 
alternative hypothesis is that hospitals reduce costs by substituting elective for non-elective admissions, 
and the ratio of elective to total admissions is higher after GBR. 
 Regardless of the direction of change, a concern arises for rural residents who have historically 
been disproportionately negatively affected by payment policy changes.22,46 The 2014 Maryland GBR 
program was implemented in hospitals with primary services areas in urban areas. If hospitals change 
their mix of elective versus non-elective admissions, they may disproportionally limit access to services 
for rural residents, who are often not in urban hospitals’ primary service areas. Further, given the 
simultaneous implementation of Medicaid expansion, it is important to understand if there are differential 
effects for insurance groups most likely affected by Medicaid expansion.  
The primary objectives of this study were to determine if there was an association between the 
Maryland GBR program and the probability of an elective admission conditional on having an admission, 
henceforth called conditional probability of elective admission, and to determine if there was a differential 




Maryland’s All-Payer Global Budget Revenue Program 
The Maryland GBR program was predicated on the state’s All-Payer Model— the result of a 
1970’s Medicare waiver that established an independent healthcare cost commission responsible for 
setting the rate structure for Maryland hospitals. Under this system, all payers—public and private—pay 
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the same hospital-specific rates for inpatient and outpatient services.8,12 The Maryland GBR program was 
first implemented in eight rural acute care hospitals in 2010 and then expanded in 2014 to the remaining 
non-federal hospitals in the state.9,10  
Under the Maryland GBR program, hospitals have limited ability to increase total revenue, and 
post hoc adjustments to revenue budgets (i.e., market shift adjustments) penalize hospitals for substantial 
decreases in patient volumes; therefore, hospitals are incentivized to not dramatically increase or 
decrease admissions, but rather, focus on reducing costs per admission to achieve a favorable annual 
operating margin. The program prospectively sets hospital budgets based on a historical base period and 
makes post hoc adjustments to account for several factors including market shift adjustments.47 Market 
shift adjustments reallocate revenue from hospitals that experience volume decreases to hospitals that 
experience volume increases accounting for collective change in volume in a service area. Market shift 
adjustments are made within defined geographic service areas using equivalent case-mix adjusted 
discharges as a unit of measure within defined service lines. Additional information regarding market shift 
adjustments calculations and examples are provided elsewhere.47  
 
Data Sources 
This analysis used 2012-2016 inpatient discharge data from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization 
Project (HCUP) State Inpatient Databases for Maryland and New York. The State Inpatient Databases 
(SID) contain patient characteristics including clinical and resource use information regarding hospital 
inpatient stays. To obtain hospital-level organizational and inpatient use characteristics, the SID were 
merged with the American Hospital Association Annual Survey,48 CMS Hospital Cost Reports,49 CMS 
Impact Files,50 and the University of North Carolina Cecil G. Sheps Center for Health Services Research 
US Hospital List (Appendix 1 Table 1). The University of North Carolina’s Institutional Review Board 
reviewed and approved this study (#19-1922). 
 
Population 
Maryland treatment hospitals included the 31 general medical or surgical hospitals that 
implemented the GBR program on January 1, 2014 and reported hospital characteristics (APPENDIX A 
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TABLE 2). The Maryland GBR program was implemented the same day the state expanded Medicaid, 
increasing eligibility for US residents with household incomes up to 138% of the federal poverty level. To 
control for this simultaneous policy implementation, control hospitals were selected from New York—a 
state that also expanded Medicaid on January 1, 2014. Given all Maryland treatment hospitals were 
located in metropolitan areas as defined as having a Rural-urban community area (RUCA) code of one 
(e.g., metropolitan area core with a primary flow within an urbanized area)51 and all hospitals in Maryland 
were non-government, not-for-profit hospitals, control hospitals were limited to New York hospitals in 
similar metropolitan areas with the same ownership type. The final sample of control hospitals included 
88 hospitals. 
The study sample included adult patients (age 18 or older) with an HCUP SID inpatient admission 
type defined as emergency, urgent, or elective. The sample excluded inpatient admissions classified as 
newborn, trauma center, or other. Complete case analysis was used to drop any observations that were 
missing patient covariate values (e.g., age, female, race, rural residence status). Missingness for most 




This analysis used multivariable difference-in-differences models to estimate the changes in 
probability of an elective admission given an admission associated with the Maryland GBR program. 
Inverse probability of treatment weights (IPTWs) were used to weight control hospitals to create an 
equivalent control group.  
The first step was to select and then assign weights to control hospitals. A logit model was used 
to estimate each hospital’s propensity score using observed baseline hospital and patient population 
characteristics thought to influence outcomes or treatment selection and outcomes (APPENDIX A).52,53 
Estimated propensity scores were then used to calculate inverse probability of treatment weights to 
estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (APPENDIX A for weight calculations and balance 
diagnostics). To assess the balance of baseline covariates, standardized mean differences between 
treated and weighted control groups were calculated.  
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Second, outcome models were estimated using linear probability models. The primary treatment 
variables were the interaction of admission to a Maryland GBR program hospital and post-implementation 
year (e.g., post 1-year, post 2-year, and post 3-year). These terms allowed for analysis of year over year 
change post treatment and identification of a lag in a treatment effect. The primary outcome was the 
conditional probability of elective admission.  
Outcome models included the admission characteristics: age, female, race, and rural residence 
status and baseline hospital characteristics: quartiles of graduate medical education (GME) spending, 
average daily census, case mix index, percent Medicare days, and county Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) (see supplementary materials for model robustness checks). Models were weighted using IPTWs 
and estimated with robust standard errors clustered at the hospital level to correct for possible 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. To understand differential treatment effects based on rural status, 
separate fully specified models were run on subgroups of rural and non-rural residing patients. To test for 
structural change based on patients’ rural status, a Chow test was performed by estimating a model with 
all covariates interacted with rural status and using a Wald test to test null hypothesis that all covariates 
are equal to zero.54  
To understand if changes in conditional probability of elective admission were specific to certain 
payers, fully specified models were estimated for each payer group: Medicare, Medicaid, private 
insurance, and self-pay, and for each payer group limited to the rural and non-rural subgroups. The 
Medicare and Medicaid subgroups included both fee-for-service and managed care patients for Medicare 
and Medicaid insurances, respectively.55 The private insurance subgroup included Blue Cross, 
commercial carriers, and private health maintenance organizations and preferred provider 
organizations.55  
Several sensitivity analyses were conducted. A falsification test was conducted to test the 
difference-in-differences assumption of parallel trends between treatment groups in the pre-period (see 
Supplementary Materials).56,57 Additionally, to control for any possible changes in admission mix due to 
hospitals using observation status for short-stay patients differently, outcome models were estimated 
restricting to observations with a length of stay (LOS) greater than two days. Analyses were conducted 




The sample included 9.4 million admissions to 31 Maryland treatment and 88 New York control 
hospitals between years 2012 and 2016. Table 1 provides weighted means and proportions of pre-period 
admission and hospital characteristics for treatment and control admissions. In the pre-period, an 
admission to a Maryland treatment hospital had lower probability of being an elective admission (0.18, 
SE: 0.02) compared to admissions to New York control hospitals (0.27, SE: 0.03). Patients admitted to 
Maryland treatment hospitals were more likely to be Black and younger compared to those admitted to 
New York control hospitals (Table 1). All hospital-level characteristics were similar between Maryland and 
New York hospitals.  
Unadjusted trends in weighted conditional probability of elective admission for Maryland 
treatment and New York control hospitals are illustrated in Figure 2. Pre-period trends were similar 
between Maryland treatment and New York control hospitals and remain relatively flat post-GBR program 
implementation. Comparisons of means and proportions of baseline characteristics between treatment 
groups indicated that weighting achieved sufficient balance between treatment groups in the weighted 
sample (APPENDIX A FIGURE 2).  
 Table 2 provides the coefficient estimates of the inverse probability of treatment weighted difference-
in-differences outcome models for conditional probability of elective admission among all adults across 
three specifications of the Model 1 including only terms for treatment, post years, and interactions of post 
years with the treatment. Model 2 included terms from Model 1 in addition to time varying admission 
characteristics: age, female, race and rural residence status. Model 3, referred to as the fully specified 
model, included terms from model 2 in addition to baseline hospital characteristics: GME spending 
quartile, average daily census, case mix index, percent Medicare days and county Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index. Among all adult admissions, there were no significant treatment effects for any treatment year. 
Results were consistent across all three model specifications. Table 3 shows the results of fully specified 
models estimating conditional probability of elective admissions among rural status and payer subgroups. 
Among rural and non-rural populations, model results showed no significant treatment effect in any 
treatment years. Payer subgroup model results show a significant association between the Maryland 
GBR program and conditional probability of elective admission among Medicaid and self-pay groups. 
 
20 
Compared to the pre-period, the probability of elective admission trended downward in both the Maryland 
and New York groups in each of the three post-implementation years for the Medicaid group. Years two 
and three of the GBR program were associated with a 5.2% (P =.004) and 7.8% (p<.001) increase in 
conditional probability of elective admission among Medicaid patients, representing less of decline in 
conditional probability of elective admission for Maryland Medicaid admissions compared to New York 
Medicaid admissions. Among the self-pay group, there was an upward trend in all three post-
implementation years compared to the pre-period in both the Maryland and New York groups. For the 
self-pay group, years two and three of the GBR program were associated with and a 7.9% (P =.032) and 
a 9.7% (P =.048) decrease in the conditional probability of elective admission, representing less of an 
increase in conditional probability of elective admission to Maryland compared to New York hospitals.  
Subgroup analyses by rural status and payer group reveal that the Medicaid and self-pay 
treatment effects seen in the pooled models are limited to non-rural residing residents (Table 4). The 
models estimated among rural residing patients show no changes in any treatment years. Among non-
rural residing patients, treatment effects were very similar to the treatment effects in the total adult 
population. A Wald test of significance of all coefficients in the fully specified model estimated among all 
adults with all covariates fully interacted with rural status suggest a differential treatment effect based on 
patients’ rural status (F value 18.30, P<.0001).  
Sensitivity analysis results of the falsification to test the difference-in-differences assumption of 
parallel trends provided no evidence of a violation of this assumption (APPENDIX A). Finally, when 
limiting admissions to admissions with LOS greater than two days, there are no substantial changes in 
treatment effects (APPENDIX A TABLE 4).  
 
Discussion 
This study’s findings show that (1) the Maryland GBR program is significantly related to less of a 
decline among Medicaid patients and less of an increase among self-pay patients in the conditional 
probability of elective admission in years two and three post implementation, and (2) these changes are 
limited to non-rural residing patients. This analysis finds that the Maryland GBR program has a treatment 
effect among the two payer groups most likely affected by Medicaid expansion—Medicaid and self-pay 
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groups—and no effect among Medicare or private pay groups. These findings suggest that the Maryland 
GBR program alone may not have a strong association with changes in inpatient use but may be 
complementary to Medicaid expansion. This dual policy implementation may provide hospitals greater 
flexibility in resource allocation to more adequately respond to changes in demand from newly insured 
Medicaid patients. Further study is needed to understand the dual impact of global budgets and Medicaid 
expansion.  
Furthermore, this study found no change in probability of elective admissions among rural 
residing residents who sought care at the same hospitals as the non-rural residing residents. This study 
includes rural patients admitted to Maryland GBR program hospitals, all of which were urban hospitals 
and excludes rural patients admitted to rural hospitals. Urban residing patients may have had fewer 
barriers to accessing care in urban hospitals in comparison to rural residing patients. Rural residents have 
been found to have cultural and financial constraints as well as insufficient public transport,58 which could 
all contribute to a disparity in access to care to the urban hospitals that implemented global budgets in 
2014. The lack of change in conditional probability of elective admission for rural residents is not 
inherently negative. The concern is that the differential treatment effect is an indicator of a growing 
disparity in access where non-rural residents are gaining improved access to elective services while rural 
residents are not. Further study is needed to understand the causal mechanisms that resulted in a 
differential effect for rural residing patients. 
There are several possible explanations for GBR being associated with an increase in the 
conditional probability of elective admission in Maryland compared to New York among patients with 
Medicaid insurance. One explanation is that under the Maryland GBR program, Maryland hospitals were 
able to reduce avoidable inpatient utilization allowing for elective admissions to account for a greater 
proportion of admissions. However, there is no consistent evidence to support that global budgets in 
Maryland have been associated with a decrease in avoidable or reducible inpatient use in the first three 
years of the program.10,11 The results of this study could support the hypothesis that hospitals favor 
elective admissions over ED admissions,59 but given the association with an increase in probability of 
elective admission was limited to Medicaid insurance the change is likely related to a factor related to 
Medicaid expansion. Finally, the considerations of hospital administrators when making decisions 
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regarding managing costs remain uncertain, as does whether a change in the mix of types of admissions 
was intentional. Ascertaining hospital administrators’ considerations in regards to managing costs would 
provide insight into the drivers of changes in mix of admission types. 
There are several limitations to this study. The study sample is admissions from the HCUP state 
inpatient databases, which limits the analysis to probability of elective admission conditional on 
admission. Using healthcare payer beneficiary data sources would allow for analysis of probability of 
admission among all enrollees. Though using the HCUP databases has the benefit of looking at 
admissions regardless of payer, which encompasses a more inclusive patient population. Prior to their 
GBR program, Maryland was an all-payer state allowing subsequent payment reforms to be implemented 
among all payers in the state. This unique policy environment along with the implementation limited to 
urban Maryland hospitals provides a very specific policy environment; thus, global budgets implemented 
in other environments may experience different results.  
 
Conclusion 
 Controlling for the expansion of Medicaid, this study found the Maryland GBR program was 
associated with an increase in the conditional probability of an elective admission among Medicaid 
patients and a decrease in conditional probability of elective admission among self-pay patients admitted 
to 31 Maryland treatment hospitals compared to patients admitted to 88 New York control hospitals. An 
increase among Medicaid patients and a decrease among self-pay patients in the conditional probability 
of elective admission was experienced by non-rural residing patients with no change among rural residing 
patients. The Maryland GBR program may further the goals of Medicaid expansion by giving hospitals 
greater flexibility in resource allocation allowing greater access to elective services for Medicaid patients. 
Though more research is needed to understand the mechanisms influencing the change in hospital 




Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 2. Inverse probability of treatment weighted trends of conditional probability of elective admission. 
 
 




































Table 1. Inverse probability of treatment weighted means and proportions of pre-period admission 
and hospital characteristics. 
 
Maryland treatment 
hospitals New York hospitals 
P-
value 
  SE  SE  
Proportion of admissions that were 
elective 0.185 0.017 0.272 0.033 0.014 
Admission characteristics      
Age 56.126 0.805 58.375 0.726 0.040 
Female 0.594 0.016 0.580 0.009 0.732 
Race      
White 0.553 0.035 0.537 0.030 <0.001 
Black 0.356 0.033 0.155 0.019  
Hispanic 0.402 0.010 0.115 0.019  
Asian or Pacific Islander 0.024 0.006 0.037 0.012  
Native American 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.0004  
Other 0.026 0.0046 0.1548 0.030  
Rural residence  0.008 0.0029 0.0076 0.004 0.441 
Hospital characteristics      
GME spending      
1st quartile  0.174 0.0771 0.1470 0.062 0.393 
2nd quartile 0.225 0.0817 0.0491 0.027  
3rd quartile 0.068 0.0651 0.0980 0.057  
4th quartile 0.080 0.0752 0.2158 0.080  
No GME spending 0.453 0.1006 0.4900 0.112  
Avg. Daily census 288 44 297 38 0.877 
Case mix index 1.567 0.0535 1.5220 0.048 0.390 
Percent Medicare days 0.414 0.0220 0.4216 0.020 0.786 
Disproportionate share adjustment 0.294 0.0374 0.3137 0.037 0.672 
County HHI 0.327 0.0550 0.2659 0.042 0.376 




Table 2. Difference-in-differences coefficient estimates (CE) for conditional probability of elective 
admission among all admissions. 





value) CE (p-value) 
Maryland -0.087 (0.020) -0.085 (0.035) -0.097 (0.006) 
Post year 1 0.010 (0.051) 0.007 (0.159) 0.007 (0.247) 
Post year 2 0.007 (0.407) 0.006 (0.505) 0.006 (0.571) 
Post year 3 0.004 (0.692) 0.003 (0.673) 0.004 (0.648) 
Post year 1 * 
treatment -0.008 (0.340) -0.005 (0.587) -0.011 (0.230) 
Post year 2 * 
treatment -0.008 (0.489) -0.003 (0.769) -0.004 (0.750) 
Post year 3 * 
treatment 0.006 (0.678) 0.009 (0.470) 0.009 (0.508) 
n 9,406,864  9,406,864  9,406,864  
Notes: all models are inverse probability of treatment weighted. Model 1 included indicators for 
treatment, post year 1, post year 2, post year 3, and interaction terms post year 1*treatment, post 
year 2* treatment and post year 3 * treatment. Model 2 included terms from Model 1 in addition to 
time varying admission characteristics: age, female, race and rural residence status. Model 3 
included terms from model 2 in addition to baseline hospital characteristics: GME spending quartile, 







Table 3. Difference-in-differences coefficient estimates (CE) for conditional probability of elective admission by residence and payer group. 
 By Patient Residence By Payer 














Treatment 0.025 (0.381) -0.097 (0.005) 0.011 (0.506) 
-
0.320 (< 0.001) -0.120 (0.001) 0.011 (0.689) 
Post year 1 0.008 (0.795) 0.007 (0.247) -0.001 (0.872) 0.000 (0.983) 0.009 (0.351) 0.024 (0.006) 
Post year 2 0.011 (0.712) 0.005 (0.576) 0.0003 (0.952) 
-
0.032 (0.046) 0.024 (0.347) 0.035 (0.035) 
Post year 3 0.031 (0.363) 0.004 (0.662) -0.0003 (0.947) 
-
0.046 (0.013) 0.031 (0.272) 0.055 (0.055) 
Post year 1 * treatment -0.016 (0.670) -0.011 (0.229) -0.007 (0.315) 0.002 (0.891) -0.012 (0.376) 
-
0.017 (0.372) 
Post year 2 * treatment -0.036 (0.381) -0.003 (0.770) -0.0002 (0.977) 0.052 (0.004) -0.022 (0.429) 
-
0.079 (0.032) 
Post year 3 * treatment -0.024 (0.669) 0.009 (0.496) 0.016 (0.128) 0.078 (< 0.001) -0.026 (0.410) 
-
0.097 (0.048) 
n 102,611  9,304,253  4,223,697  2,054,754  2,708,590  217,185  
Notes: all models are inverse probability of treatment weighted and included the terms for time varying admission characteristics: age, 
female, race and rural residence status and baseline hospital characteristics: quartiles of GME spending, average daily census, case mix 





Table 4. Difference-in-differences coefficient estimates (CE) for conditional probability of elective admission by rural 
status and payer group.  
 Rural 
 Medicare Medicaid Private Insurance Self-Pay 
 CE (p-value) CE (p-value) CE (p-value) CE (p-value) 
Treatment 0.092 (0.037) -0.200 (< 0.001) 0.002 (0.964) 0.063 (0.242) 
Post year 1 -0.012 (0.628) -0.021 (0.488) 0.030 (0.523) -0.004 (0.917) 
Post year 2 0.008 (0.790) -0.002 (0.965) 0.018 (0.648) 0.047 (0.398) 
Post year 3 0.032 (0.352) 0.017 (0.549) 0.030 (0.504) 0.058 (0.199) 
Post year 1 * treatment -0.013 (0.704) 0.076 (0.078) -0.035 (0.487) -0.040 (0.598) 
Post year 2 * treatment -0.045 (0.290) 0.075 (0.085) -0.058 (0.207) -0.097 (0.318) 
Post year 3 * treatment -0.024 (0.653) 0.060 (0.350) -0.028 (0.630) -0.130 (0.054) 
n 50,495   13,716   31,341   2,972  
 Non-Rural 
 Medicare Medicaid Private Insurance Self-Pay 
 CE (p-value) CE (p-value) CE (p-value) CE (p-value) 
Treatment 0.011 (0.510) -0.320 (< 0.001) -0.120 (0.001) 0.010 (0.699) 
Post year 1 -0.001 (0.880) 0.000 (0.977) 0.008 (0.357) 0.025 (0.005) 
Post year 2 0.000 (0.966) -0.032 (0.046) 0.024 (0.350) 0.035 (0.035) 
Post year 3 -0.001 (0.900) -0.046 (0.013) 0.031 (0.275) 0.055 (0.056) 
Post year 1 * treatment -0.007 (0.310) 0.002 (0.909) -0.012 (0.381) -0.017 (0.371) 
Post year 2 * treatment 0.000 (0.982) 0.052 (0.004) -0.021 (0.441) -0.079 (0.033) 
Post year 3 * treatment 0.016 (0.114) 0.078 (< 0.001) -0.026 (0.413) -0.097 (0.049) 
n 4,173,202 2,041,038 2,677,249 214,213 
Notes: all models are inverse probability of treatment weighted and included the following admission characteristics 
and baseline hospital characteristics as controls: quartiles of GME spending, average daily census, case mix index, 








CHAPTER 3: INTERHOSPITAL TRANSFERS AND INPATIENT CAPACITY OF RURAL AND URBAN 
HOSPITALS IN MARYLAND BEFORE AND AFTER GLOBAL BUDGETS 
 
Overview 
 Purpose:  The Maryland Global Budget Revenue (GBR) program is associated with a decrease in 
interhospital transfers and fewer admissions. This study will describe interhospital transfers and inpatient 
capacity among rural compared to urban hospitals before and after the Maryland GBR program. 
Methods: Transfers in and transfers out from other acute care hospitals were described using 
interhospital data from the 2012-2017 Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project Maryland State Inpatient 
Databases. Average daily census (ADC) and the number of staffed beds were described using the 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services hospital impact files. 
Findings: Rural and urban hospitals experienced opposite trends in transfers in following policy 
implementation with both groups deviating from pre-policy trends. Urban hospitals experienced an 
unexpected decline driven by a decrease among the two academic medical centers (AMCs), while rural 
hospitals experienced an unexpected increase in transfers in. Conversely, rural and urban hospitals both 
experienced an unexpected decrease in the number of transfers out in the second year following policy 
implementation. ADC and the number of staffed beds declined among both rural and urban hospitals 
following policy implementation with the exception of the state’s two AMCs experiencing an increase in 
ADC following policy implementation.  
Conclusion: Fewer transfers in among urban hospitals could be concerning, particularly for rural 
hospitals seeking to transfer patients to urban hospitals, if this trend is due to urban hospitals increasingly 
denying transfer requests. While an increase in transfers in among rural hospital could be a spillover 







Rural hospital closure worsens access for rural residents who already are at higher risk for poorer 
health outcomes.60 With more than 130 rural hospital closures in the last decade,61 policy makers have 
looked to alternative payment models to help prevent rural hospital closure. One such model is global 
budgets. Global budgets offer rural hospitals a pathway to stabilize revenue. Under global budgets, 
hospitals are provided a prospectively determined total budget for revenue for participating payers, where 
achieving a favorable profit margin is obtained by keeping costs below their total revenue budget. This 
payment model provides hospitals a predictable annual revenue and increases hospitals’ incentive to 
deliver efficient and high value care. 
However, eliminating the tie between volume and revenue under a global budget model 
introduces the risk of hospitals seeking to avoid costly patient encounters.10,40 For example, one study 
found an association between the Maryland Global Budget Revenue (GBR) program and a decrease in 
interhospital transfers.39 Under the Maryland GBR program, new patient encounters do not always 
represent new opportunities because revenue budgets are capped. The Maryland Health Services Cost 
Review Commission (HSCRC), the agency responsible for setting hospital reimbursement rates, 
recognized this as a potential disincentive under the state’s GBR program for hospitals to accept transfers 
from other acute care hospitals. This disincentive could be particularly detrimental for patients at rural 
hospitals needing transfer to a higher level of care. Thus, the HSCRC updated the calculation that splits 
the diagnosis-related group payments between the transferring and receiving hospitals so that the 
receiving hospital received a greater proportion of the payment.40 The adjustment only applied to the two 
AMCs, the Johns Hopkins Hospital and the University of Maryland Medical Center, to help preserve 
capacity and resources at these hospitals that provide the most comprehensive set of services for 
complex patients.40 Additional evidence of possible service avoidance can be seen in a Maryland Institute 
of Emergency Medical Services report that demonstrated an increase in hospitals’ use of ambulance 
diversion status—a mechanism hospitals use to redirect ambulances when their emergency departments 
(EDs) are full—following the Maryland GBR program implementation.27 This trend may indicate a 
contraction of operational inpatient capacity. In addition to potentially restricting access to ED’s, a lack of 
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inpatient capacity could be particularly concerning for patients at rural hospitals requiring transfer to a 
tertiary referral center. 
Given rural hospitals are typically the transferring hospitals and urban hospitals, particularly the 
two AMCs, are typically the receiving hospitals in interhospital transfers, a comparison of the transfer 
behavior at rural and urban hospitals would provide better potential implications of changes in 
interhospital transfer volumes. Additionally, analyzing changes in average daily census (ADC) and 
number of staffed beds among rural and urban hospitals could provide insight into changes in inpatient 
capacity that could influence interhospital transfer rates among. The objective of this study was to 
describe changes in interhospital transfers, ADC, and number of staffed beds before and after the 
Maryland’s state-wide implementation of GBR in 2014 comparing rural to urban hospitals. 
 
Methods 
Data Sources and Measures 
Rural status of hospitals was defined using the Federal Office of Rural Health Policy crosswalk of 
ZIP codes.62 The Federal Office of Rural Health Policy recognizes all non-metropolitan counties as rural 
and uses an additional method of determining rurality among metropolitan areas called the rural-urban 
commuting area (RUCA) codes. RUCAs are measured at the Census tract-level assigning a code to each 
Census tract. Tracts inside metropolitan counties with the codes 4-10 are recognized as rural.62 The 
Maryland Geographic Information System catalog was used to identify the geographic location of all 
general acute care hospitals in the state.63   
This study examined two primary and two secondary outcomes of interest. Two measures of 
interhospital transfers were defined as (1) the number of transfers in, including transfers in from other 
acute care hospitals, and (2) the number of transfers out, including transfers out to other acute care 
hospitals. Transfer data were sourced from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project Maryland State 
Inpatient Database for years 2012 through 2017.64 The secondary outcomes were (1) ADC defined as the 
number of inpatient acute care bed days divided by the days in the period and (2) the number of staffed 
beds defined as the number of beds available for use by patients at the end of the cost reporting period. 
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ADC and staffed beds data came from Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) cost Impact Files for 
years 2010 through 2017.65  
 
Hospital Inclusion Criteria and Analytic Approach 
All 46 non-federal acute care hospitals in Maryland were included in this study with a few 
exceptions. There were six rural hospitals, but because two of these hospitals (University of Maryland 
Dorchester and Easton hospitals) report together, this study has n=5 rural hospitals. Of the 40 urban 
hospitals, one (University of Maryland St. Joseph Medical Center) had to be excluded from the 
examination of transfer cases because it did not report during one of two of the pre-period years, limiting 
the ability to estimate a pre-period trend.  
 
Analysis 
This study is a descriptive comparison of pre- versus post-GBR outcomes comparing urban to 
rural hospitals using estimated pre-period trends as a reference for post trends. The pre-period was 
defined as 2010 through 2013 and the post period as 2014 through 2017. For transfers in and transfers 
out, the pre-period trends were estimated using generalized linear models to predicted proportional 
change. Showing proportional change was more helpful (compared to level change) to be able to 
compare change between urban and rural hospitals which experience substantially different number of 
transfers. Ordinary least square models were used to predict pre-period trends in ADC providing an 




 To understand changes in transfers in, Figure 3 shows the annual sum of transfers in by rural status, 
and Figure 4 shows the number of transfers in by hospital and rural status. Results in Figure 3 show that 
among rural hospitals, there was a negative trend in transfers in during the pre-period showing a 16.5% 
drop in transfers in from 2012 to 2013. In the post-period there is a substantial deviation from this trend 
with a sharp increase in the number of transfers in with 2016 experiencing 130% of 2012 volume. Among 
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urban hospitals, there was also a negative pre-period trend showing a 3.0% drop of transfers in from 
2012 to 2013. In the post-period, transfers in among urban hospitals dropped 5.6% from 2014 to 2015 
then dropped 16.9% from 2015 to 2016 and remained fairly flat in the following two years. Figure 4 
provides a hospital-level perspective in trends of transfers in. Four of the five rural hospitals have zero or 
near zero transfers in during the study period, while the two hospitals (reporting together as one hospital), 
University of Maryland Easton and Dorchester hospitals are the hospitals contributing to the overall trend. 
The urban hospitals driving the downward trend in post-period are the two AMCs University of Maryland 
Medical Center and Johns Hopkins Hospital, both of which experience steady declines in each post-
period year with the steepest decline between 2014 and 2015. Other urban hospitals’ transfers in remain 
relatively flat in comparison in the post-period. 
 To understand changes in transfers out, Figure 5 shows the annual sum of transfers out by rural 
status. Rural hospitals experienced a downward trend in transfers out during the pre-period with 2013 
experiencing a 4.4% drop in volume compared to 2012—a trend that flattens out in the post-period with a 
substantial decline in 2015 that represented a 13.1% drop from 2014 (Figure 5). Urban hospitals 
experienced an opposite trend where the sum of transfers out increased in the pre-period with 2013 
experiencing a 1.2% increase in volume compared to 2012. The post-period years increased at about the 
same rate with the exception of a 1.2% decrease in 2015 compared to 2014. Examination of transfers out 
at the hospital level shows that the decline among rural hospitals in 2015 was experienced relatively more 
uniformly across hospitals.  
 Figure 6 shows the sum of ADC by rural status. Both rural and urban hospitals experienced a 
downward trend in the four-year pre-period and experienced even greater decline in ADC in the four-year 
post-period. Among rural hospitals, the average yearly sum of ADC was 239.25 in the pre-period and 
199.75 in the post-period, below the projected average of 216.77 if the post-period trend was similar to 
the pre-period trend. Among urban hospitals, the average yearly sum of ADC was 7,999.50 in the pre-
period and 7,603.00 in the post-period, below the projected average of 7,810.60 if the post-period trend 
was similar to the pre-period trend. Figure 7 is a boxplot of ADC by hospital with labels identifying the two 
AMCs and the rural hospital outlier (University of Maryland Easton and Dorchester hospitals combined). 
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In contrast to the downward trend overall among urban hospitals, the two AMCs, which have the highest 
ADC year over year, experience an upward trend in the post-period.  
 Figure 8 shows the sum of staffed beds (line) and the sum of average daily census (bars) for 
comparison across rural and urban hospitals. Among rural and urban hospitals, there is a greater decline 
in number of staffed beds following GBR implementation compared to the pre-period. Comparing these 
trends to the sum of ADC for each year suggest that percent occupancy stayed fairly consistent among 




Following GBR implementation, rural and urban hospitals experienced opposite changes trends 
in transfers in and transfers out, while overall, both experienced notable declines in ADC and staffed beds 
compared to pre-period levels. Rural hospitals experienced an unexpected increase while urban hospitals 
overall experienced an unexpected decrease in transfers in—though the two AMCs experienced a 
decrease in transfers in. This decline among the two AMCs was the opposite of policy maker’s intentions. 
In the context of fewer staffed beds among urban hospitals, the declines in transfers in among urban 
hospitals could be a spillover effect of lack of inpatient capacity. Further, increase in transfers in among 
rural hospitals could be a spillover effect of the reduction of transfers in and/or the contraction of inpatient 
capacity among urban hospitals. 
An important context to note for interpreting results is that the trends in transfers in were driven by 
a few hospitals. In regards to transfers in, there were only a few transfers in among rural hospitals in the 
pre-period which were predominately at only two hospitals—University of Maryland Easton and 
Dorchester hospitals. Among urban hospitals, the two AMCs have the highest volumes of transfers in. 
Following GBR implementation, rural hospitals, particularly the two beforementioned hospitals, 
experienced an increase in transfers in while urban hospitals experienced a decline, which was driven by 
a decline among the two AMCs. In regards to transfers out, rural hospitals experienced a decline, most 




Maryland’s two AMCs experienced increased ADC, while collectively, the other urban hospitals 
experienced a decrease substantial enough to drive the overall ADC trend downward. This phenomenon 
could be concerning considering the HSCRC’s goal to preserve capacity and resources at these two 
centers to accommodate transfers in.40 It is possible that the decrease in transfers in among the two 
AMCs is the result of a decrease in out-of-state transfers. However, current evidence suggests this may 
not be the case. The CMS commissioned evaluation found that nonresident share of Medicare 
admissions to Maryland hospitals remained constant through the pre-period and post-period periods 
through 2016.10 Further, the decline in ADC of most hospitals in the state with the exception of the two 
AMCs, in the context of greater use of ambulance diversion following GBR implementation27 suggests this 
decline in ADC may have had negative implications for access to emergency medical services. The lower 
ADC in most hospitals may represent a contraction of inpatient capacity leaving the AMCs as the safety 
net for patients seeking emergency services.  
The two AMCs’ increases in ADC coupled with decreases in transfers in following GBR 
implementation could indicate that the two AMCs may have experienced capacity issues related to GBR 
program implementation that affected their ability to accept transfers from other acute care hospitals. The 
increase in transfers in among rural hospitals, particularly at the University of Maryland Easton and 
Dorchester hospitals may be a spillover effect of the AMCs not having capacity. Two possible pathways 
for the increase in transfers in among rural hospitals are that (1) urban hospitals, particularly the two 
AMCs, burdened with high occupancy and/or crowded EDs may have transferred patients from their ED 
to the rural hospitals when they did not have available inpatient beds in their hospitals and the patients 
did not require the services only provided at their hospital and (2) transfers were made to rural hospitals 
when the originally requested hospital was too full to accept a transfer.  
 
Limitations 
This study had several limitations. This study was a descriptive analysis meant to identify possible 
trends to explore further and thus, should not be used to assess the estimates of GBR on these 
outcomes. Additionally, for transfer case outcomes, this study included only two pre-period timepoints to 
calculate pre-period time trends. In terms of generalizability, Maryland is a relatively smaller state with a 
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high percent the state being urban, and a few hospitals account for a substantial proportion of volumes 
such as transfers and ADC. Finally, this analysis only examined three measures, which provide a small 
perspective in understanding complex hospital operations. 
 
Policy Implications 
Although GBR provides predictable revenue and other benefits to hospitals, there are potential 
concerns. This study provides evidence that GBR incentives change hospitals interhospital transfer 
behavior, and the diagnosis related group payment adjustment does not sufficiently mitigate the incentive 
to decrease interhospital transfers. This incentive could be particularly detrimental to patients at rural 
hospitals awaiting transfer for services not available locally. Additionally, this study found that GBR 
incentives may have resulted in capacity restraints, particularly at the state’s two academic medical 
centers—the very hospitals where policy makers intended to preserve capacity for interhospital transfers.  
The findings of this study provide support for continued evaluation of the Maryland GBR model with 
particularly attention to interhospital transfers behavior. First, it is important to monitor transfers in and 
transfers out at the hospital level to identify substantial changes before they cause capacity or access 
problems. Further, it may be beneficial to monitor transfer acceptance rates to identify if declines in 
transfers in are to fewer transfer requests, or more concerning an increase in transfer request denials. 
Second, there is a need for continued assessment of the support for academic medical centers to assess 
whether financial and other support for academic medical centers is sufficient to ensure maintenance of 
capacity. Finally, there may be benefit in developing a transfer prioritization criterion that prioritizes rural 




























Figure 6. Sum of average daily census by rural status. 










Figure 8. Sum of staffed beds and sum of average daily census by rural status. 
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CHAPTER 4: ASSOCIATION OF THE MARYLAND GLOBAL BUDGET REVENUE PROGRAM AND 
EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES (EMS) TRANSPORT TIMES 
 
Overview 
Importance: One of the concerns of the Maryland Global Budget Revenue (GBR) program is that the 
replacement of a volume-based incentive with a cost-containment incentive could encourage hospitals to 
limit inpatient capacity. Contraction of inpatient capacity could negatively affect access to emergency 
medical services (EMS). 
Objectives: To assess the association of Maryland GBR program and EMS transport times for 9-1-1 
calls. 
Design, Setting, and Study Population: Observational study of EMS activations within 18 Maryland 
treatment hospital service areas (HSAs) and 202 out-of-state HSAs in calendar years 2013 through 2016 
using data from the National EMS Information System database.  
Exposure: Maryland GBR program implementation in 2014 
Main Outcomes and Measures: EMS transport time measured as elapsed time in minutes between 
the time a ground transportation EMS unit left the incident location and arrival at hospital. 
Results: The sample included 3,783,285 EMS activations. In year one, two, and three post 
implementation, the Maryland GBR program was not significantly associated with a change in mean EMS 
transport times among adult EMS activations. Among adults experiencing cardiac arrest, the Maryland 
GBR program was associated with a 0.80-minute increase (95% CI, 0.12 to 1.48 minute; P = .022) in 
mean EMS transport times in year one representing an 8.09 percent from a baseline of 8.91 minutes. 
However, when excluding HSAs with significant year over year increases in 9-1-1 call—increases 
associated with EMS agencies initiating reporting during the study time period—this association 
diminishes and is no longer significant.  
Conclusions and Relevance: This study found no evidence that the Maryland GBR program was 
associated with an increase in EMS transport times among adults and limited evidence of an increase  
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among adults experiencing cardiac arrest. While monitoring spillover effects of the changed financial 
incentives under global budgets may be important, this study provides little evidence that transport times 
are one of those effects. 
Introduction 
Maryland’s Global Budget Revenue (GBR) program is widely viewed as a success in terms of 
achieving Medicare savings and improving quality in the hospital setting.13,15,66 Since the 2014 
implementation, Maryland has expanded the global budget model to include non-hospital health care 
providers, and other states such as Pennsylvania have adopted global budgets in new settings.67-69 
Global budgets have also been proposed as a payment mechanism in U.S. congressional healthcare 
reform proposals.6 However, replacing a volume-based incentive under a fee-for-service model with a 
cost-containment incentive under a global budget model in a hospital setting introduces the risk of 
hospitals avoiding costly patient encounters. If hospitals restrict capacity, such as limiting inpatient bed 
capacity, as a means to contain costs, such practices could negatively affect timely access to care.10  
There is some evidence that hospitals reduced inpatient capacity under the Maryland GBR policy 
and that access to emergency departments (EDs) may have been negatively affected. Results of aim two 
of this dissertation demonstrates a reduction in number of staffed beds following the Maryland GBR 
program. Additionally, Maryland’s Institute for Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems reported a 
pattern of hospitals’ increasing use of ambulance diversion status—a tool hospitals use to decompress 
crowded EDs,27 despite volume of emergency room visits remaining relatively flat.70 Increases in use of 
ambulance diversions have been shown to increase EMS transport times.33,34,71 Additionally, use of 
hospital diversion status has been found to be associated with an increased risk of mortality among 
patients experiencing cardiac arrest.33,34,71 These findings provide some indicators that the Maryland GBR 
program may be associated with increased access barriers to hospital services, particularly ED services 
and could be detrimental to patient outcomes for certain patient groups.  
There have been no studies examining the association of the Maryland GBR program with EMS 
transport times. If the increase in the use of ambulance diversions observed during the years following 
implementation of the Maryland GBR program increased transport time for patients transported by EMS, it 
could be consequential for patients with time sensitive conditions such as cardiac arrest. The objective of 
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this study was to assess the association of the Maryland GBR program and EMS transport times for 9-1-1 




Difference-in-differences models were used to estimate the effects of the Maryland GBR program 
on EMS transport times. Isolating the effect of the Maryland GBR program on ambulance diversion and 
transport times is challenging given that Maryland simultaneously expanded Medicaid state-wide and 
implemented the GBR program in predominately urban areas. To control for the simultaneous 
implementation of Medicaid expansion and other potential temporal confounders, I identified hospital 
service areas (HSAs) in non-bordering states that also expanded Medicaid on the same day as the 
Maryland GBR program as a non-equivalent comparison group (See APPENDIX C for state selection). 
Control HSAs were weighted using inverse probability of treatment weights (IPTWs), a propensity score 
method that allows the preservation of all treatment HSAs in the sample while using weights to create a 
counterfactual for Maryland HSAs. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Institutional Review 
Board reviewed and approved this study waiving requirement of informed consent for research (IRB# 19-
1922).  
 
Sample and Measures 
 The outcome of interest in this study is EMS transport time defined as the elapsed time in minutes 
between an EMS unit leaving the incident location and arriving at the hospital. EMS transport times and 
other EMS-level measures were provided by the National Emergency Medical Services Information 
System (NEMSIS).72 The National EMS Database provides a standardized set of publicly available data 
elements describing EMS activations preserving geographic anonymity through use of blinded geographic 
indicators. Permission was obtained from the Maryland Institute of Emergency Medical Services Systems 
to identify EMS activations that occurred in Maryland. The pre-period was defined as 2013 and the post-
period as 2014-2016.  
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The unit of analysis is an EMS activation and is defined as response of an EMS unit to a 9-1-1 
call resulting in ground transportation to a hospital with the use of lights or sirens. EMS transports not 
using lights or sirens includes non-time sensitive transportations (e.g., transport between healthcare 
facilities), and thus is not considered as important of a population to understand potential changes in 
transport times. This study excluded EMS activations for adults under 18 years of age. The highest and 
lowest one percent of EMS transport times were excluded under the assumption that those extreme 
values were data entry errors (e.g., trip time of zero minutes or greater than 24 hours) (APPENDIX C 
FIGURE 1). For identifying the subgroup of cardiac arrest patients, this study used the NEMSIS database 
indicator for patients who experienced cardiac arrest.  
I used 2010 Hospital Service Areas (HSAs) from the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care.73 as a unit 
of measure to select control areas to compare to treatment areas. HSAs are a geographic measure of 
local hospital markets commonly used to measure variation in health care spending, access, and 
quality.74-76 Maryland treatment areas consisted of 18 HSAs that contained the 33 treatment hospitals that 
were then matched to 202 weighted control HSAs from eight non-bordering states that expanded 
Medicaid the same day as Maryland (e.g., Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont). I used the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care Supplemental 
Research Data ZIP-code-to-HSA and hospital-to-HSA crosswalks73 and the Missouri Census Data Center 
(MCDC) Geographic Correspondence Engine that provided a crosswalks and allocation factors linking 
2010 US counties in the Area Health Resource Files (AHRF) to 2010 HSAs.77 
County-level measures from the AHRF were used to calculate HSA-level measures for propensity 
score estimation models. County-level measures included: number of short-term hospitals, number of 
short-term general hospital beds, number of inpatient days in short-term general hospitals, number of 
emergency department visits, percent of persons below poverty level, percent of population reporting 
white for race, and rural-urban status. Rural status was dichotomized defining rural counties as counties 
with a baseline year rural urban continuum codes (RUCC) 1-3 and counties with a RUCC 4-9 as not-
rural.51 Inpatient occupancy rate of a short-term general hospital was defined as number of inpatient days 





First, inverse probability of treatment weights were calculated from estimated propensity scores 
and used to create a counterfactual group of HSAs selected from eight states that expanded Medicaid 
January 1, 2014.78 Prior to estimating propensity scores, control HSAs were exact-matched on non-rural 
status given that all Maryland treatment HSAs were is urban areas. Propensity score models were 
estimated using a logistic regression model where treatment assignment (Maryland treatment HSA vs. 
out-of-state control HSA) was regressed on covariates in a simple specification (e.g., no higher order 
terms). Covariates in the propensity score model included HSA characteristics that could influence the 
outcome or both treatment selection and outcome.52,79 The baseline covariates included the HSA-level 
measures coarsened by quantiles to provide geographic anonymity: quartile of number of short-term 
hospitals, quartile of number of emergency department visits, quartile of percent occupancy, tertile of 
percent of persons below poverty level, quartile percent of population that is white (APPENDIX C).  
Second, propensity scores were used to calculate the inverse probability of treatment for 
estimating the average treatment effect in the treated (see Supplementary Materials IPTW). To assess 
the balance of baseline covariates, standardized differences between treated and weighted control 
groups were calculated. Standardized differences provided comparisons of means and proportions of 
baseline covariates—a method of comparison that is not influenced by sample size. A standardized 
difference less than 10% is considered by some authors as indicative of achieving sufficient balance.53,80  
Third, multivariable difference-in-differences models were used to estimate the changes in EMS 
transport times associated with the Maryland GBR program. The primary treatment variables were the 
interaction between location of an EMS activation in a Maryland GBR program HSA and post-
implementation year (e.g., post 1-year, post 2-year, and post 3-year). These terms allowed for analysis of 
the post treatment trends. Outcome models also included year fixed effects for post 1-year, post 2-year, 
and post 3-year. Ordinary least square models were estimated with robust standard errors clustered at 
the HSA-level, weighted using IPTWs. 
Outcome models also included EMS activation-level control variables that could vary over time 
and thought to influence EMS transport time, including: patient’s age, gender, and primary symptom as 
recorded by EMS personnel; indicator for cardiac arrest before or after EMS arrived on the scene; 
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incident location type; single versus multiple patients at the scene, and; reason for choosing destination. 
A subgroup analysis was conducted limiting the analytic sample to EMS activations where the patient 
experienced cardiac arrest either prior to or after EMS arrived at the incident scene.  
Several sensitivity analyses and robustness checks were conducted. First, I estimated a second 
specification for the propensity score model including higher order terms for each covariate referred to as 
complex specification. Second, I included two additional specifications of outcome models, one estimated 
with a single treatment and post interaction specification. Third, I conducted a sensitivity analysis to 
address the fact that EMS agencies did not report data every year. Specifically, there was a “ramp-up” 
trend observed in Maryland where some areas may have zero to few EMS activations one year and 
exponential growth in EMS activation volume the following year. Maryland EMS leadership confirmed that 
Maryland EMS agencies started to report in 2012, and by 2016, all EMS agencies were reporting. To 
address this, a third specification of the outcome model included a measure of 2013 EMS activation 
volume expressed as a percent of 2016 EMS activation volume at the HSA-level to control for the effect 
of agencies starting to report in years after 2013. To further control for changes in transport times due to 
changes in status of EMS agencies reporting data (e.g., addressing the reporting “ramp-up”), the sample 
was limited to HSAs where the 2013 percent of 2016 volume was greater than fifty percent—a distinct 
break in the distribution of the data. I re-estimated propensity score matching models, recalculated 
IPTWs, and conducted outcome analyses on this reduced sample. Analyses were conducted using Stata 




The sample included 3,783,376 EMS activations for the period of January 1, 2013 through 
December 31, 2016. The subgroup included 42,297 EMS activations for patients experiencing cardiac 
arrest. Between the two propensity score model specifications, the complex specification achieved better 
balance with a mean standardized difference of 6.1% among the HSA-level covariates. Four of the five 
measured baseline covariates had standardized differences below 10%, with the highest of 14.3% for the 
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quartile measure of percent white (APPENDIX C FIGURE 2). The mean IPTW was 0.15 and the minimum 
and maximum weights were 0.0001 and 1.74.  
Trends in the inverse probability of treatment weighted mean EMS transport times for treatment 
and out-of-state control HSAs are shown in Figure 12 for all adults and Figure 13 for adults experiencing 
cardiac arrest. Among adult EMS activations, Maryland HSAs show a slight upward trend in EMS 
transport times from 2013 through 2016 while the out of state group remains relatively flat. In the pre-
period, the average EMS transport time was 9.21 minutes (95% CI, 6.81 to 11.61) for 9-1-1 calls that 
occurred within Maryland treatment HSAs and 9.12 (95% CI, 7.91 to 10.33) within out-of-state weighted 
control HSAs. EMS activation trends for adults experiencing cardiac arrest remain relatively flat in both 
the Maryland and control groups. The pre-period average EMS transport time for adults experiencing 
cardiac arrest was 8.91 minutes (95% CI, 7.06 to 10.75) among Maryland treatment HSAs and 8.42 
minutes (95% CI, 7.45 to 9.40) among out-of-state weighted control HSAs. 
Table 9 shows unadjusted pre-period comparison of characteristics of EMS activations for 
Maryland and the control group. In the baseline period prior to the Maryland GBR program 
implementation, EMS activations in Maryland GBR HSAs were more likely to have primary symptom 
breathing problems, change in responsiveness, pain, or weakness; and have an incent location type of 
street or highway, public building, healthcare facility, or residential institution compared to EMS 
activations in the out-of-state control group. The most significant difference between treatment groups 
was in regards to reason for choosing facility where Maryland GBR program HSAs experienced an 
average proportion of 0.74 (95% CI, 0.72 to 0.75) of EMS activations with documented reason for 
choosing a destination as closest facility while control group HSAs experienced a proportion of 0.39 (95% 
CI, 0.25 to 0.55). The control group experienced a higher proportion of EMS activations documenting 
patient choice as the reason for choosing destination 0.38 (95% CI, 0.28 to 0.48) compared to the 
treatment group proportion of 0.05 (95% CI, 0.04 to 0.06).  
Coefficient estimates for the three specifications of the outcome model for adult EMS activations 
and EMS activations for adults experiencing cardiac arrest are provided in Tables 10 and 11, 
respectively. For each population, the estimates included (1) a simple pre-post difference-in-differences 
model, (2) a model with post treatment indicators for each post year and interaction of each post year with 
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treatment, and (3) specification from model two with the addition of a term for 2013 EMS activation 
volume as a percent of 2016 EMS activation volume—a fully adjusted model. In the fully adjusted model, 
the Maryland GBR program was associated with a small and not significantly significant decrease in 
mean EMS transport times among adult EMS activations in all years across all model specifications 
(Table 10). Among patients experiencing cardiac arrest, in year one post implementation, Maryland All-
Payor GBR program was associated with a 0.72-minute increase (95% CI, 0.13 minute to 1.32 minute; P 
= .018) in mean EMS transport times not controlling for 2013 volume as percent of 2016 volume and a 
0.80-minute increase (95% CI, 0.11 minute to 1.48 minute; P = .022) in the fully adjusted model (Table 
11). These increases represent an 8.09 and 8.99 percent increase from the baseline average EMS 
transport time of 8.91 minutes. The subsequent two years experienced a small non-significant estimated 
increase at the P < .05 level (Table 11).  
In sensitivity analyses limiting the sample to HSAs with 2013 volume at least fifty percent of 2016 
EMS activation volumes, results were similar among adult EMS activations (APPENDIX C TABLE 2). 
Among adults experiencing cardiac arrest, the treatment effect in year one diminished and was no longer 
significant at the P < .05 level (APPENDIX C TABLE 3).  
 
Discussion 
Despite potential concerns about unintended consequences of the GBP on emergency transport, the 
Maryland GBR program was not associated with increases in patient transport times among a general 
adult population after controlling for HSA characteristics, the expansion of Medicaid, EMS activation 
characteristics, and post-year fixed effects. Among adults experiencing cardiac arrest, this study found 
some evidence that the Maryland GBR program was associated with an eight to nine percent increase in 
transport times in the first-year post policy implementation. However, results of sensitivity analyses 
indicate that the treatment effect among cardiac arrest patients could be the result of changes in EMS 
agencies’ reporting patterns. 
Under fee-for-service payment models, hospitals have a volume incentive to admit patients from the 
ED. Global budgeting eliminates this incentive, which could encourage limiting inpatient capacity and 
increase the use of ambulance diversion status as a way to mitigate the resulting ED crowding. The 
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primary reason for ambulance diversion has been patient safety.26 However, an ethical dilemma arises 
when hospitals are accountable for the safety of patients in their own ED but not for those traveling by 
ambulance seeking access to their ED. Global budgets potentially deepen this dilemma by making 
ambulance diversion a financially beneficial strategy for a hospital. If this incentive increases ambulance 
diversion and thus transport times, it also potentially increases poor patient outcomes for patients 
transported by EMS, particularly for patients experiencing an acute myocardial infarction.32-34  
Replacing a volume-based incentive with a cost-avoidance incentive under the Maryland GBR 
program could incentivize hospitals to avoid costly patients, such as those admitted from the ED.59,81 One 
mechanism for avoiding potentially costly ED patients is to reduce inpatient capacity, either by allocating 
more inpatient beds to scheduled (i.e. elective) admissions,59,81 by staffing fewer beds, or both. For 
example, hospitals could reduce their inpatient capacity by more frequently temporarily closing inpatient 
beds when nursing staff call out sick, rather than pay overtime or other staffing-related premiums to keep 
beds open. Reduced inpatient capacity has been linked to ED crowding and ambulance diversion, a 
practice where hospitals divert ambulances to another hospital due to lack of capacity.23,82 
Additional studies using different data sources are needed to better control for the confounding 
factor of changes in EMS agency reporting over time. Further, a better understanding is needed of 
hospitals’ use of short-term bed closures and ambulance diversion status and the relationship between 
these hospital behaviors in global budget payment environments. More research is needed to understand 
the implications of these hospital behaviors for patient outcomes.  
There were several limitations to this study. The National EMS Database is a large convenience 
sample, and not a population-based sample. It may not be representative of all states or EMS agencies in 
the country. The unit of observation is event-based rather than patient-based and therefore does not 
control for within patient use. The biggest limitation to this study was the fact that Maryland EMS 
agencies, particularly those in larger counties did not contribute to all years in the study. This required the 
study to be limited to one year of pre-period data (2013) because so few Maryland EMS agencies were 
reporting data in 2012. Having only one year of pre-period data limits the ability to test parallel trend 
assumptions. Further, these larger areas with poor reporting participation were excluded in sensitivity 
analyses, when these areas may have been most susceptible to increasing ambulance diversions 
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following GBR implementation. This data limitation may have prevented detection of the dull magnitude of 
change in EMS transport times.  
Additionally, differences in EMS activation characteristics may be the result of differences in how 
different EMS agencies report different information. The study population was defined by analyzing EMS 
activations within HSAs. There are known variations among HSAs in the percent of HSA residents 
seeking treatment outside of assigned HSA.75 Though seeking treatment outside of an individual’s HSA is 
likely less frequent in urban areas with multiple hospitals. Finally, the 2014 implementation of Maryland 
GBR program was in urban hospitals which have higher average percent occupancy compared to rural 
hospitals.83 Global budgets in rural areas may not experience the same relationship between global 
budgets and EMS transport times. In fact, rural areas may be shielded from this spill-over effect given 
average occupancy in rural hospitals is lower compared to urban hospitals.83  
 
Conclusions 
This study found no evidence that the Maryland GBR program was associated with increase EMS 
transport times among the adult population in the three years following policy implementation and limited 
evidence of an increase in EMS transport times in the first year following policy implementation among 
adults experiencing cardiac arrest. Caution is advised in interpreting these results as sensitivity analyses 
indicate initiation of EMS agency reporting may be a contributing factor to the change in transport times in 
this sub-population. More research is needed to isolate the effect of the Maryland GBR program from 
changes in EMS agency reporting. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 9. Trends in mean EMS transport time in Maryland treatment HSAs and out-of-state control HSAs 
among EMS activations for adults (inverse probability of treatment weighted trends). 
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Figure 10. Trends in mean EMS transport time in Maryland treatment HSAs and out-of-state control 
HSAs among EMS activations for adults experiencing with cardiac arrest (inverse probability of treatment 
weighted trends). 
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Table 5. Weighted baseline (2013) EMS activation characteristics 





control HSAsa   
  SE  SE 
p-
value 
No. of EMS activations 104,830  810,817   
Patient age (mean) 55.037 0.940 58.113 1.032 0.029 
Patient sex     <.001 
    Female 0.513 0.007 0.517 0.007  
    Male 0.487 0.007 0.476 0.006  
    Not known/not available 0.000 <0.001 0.007 0.001  
Primary symptom     <0.001 
Bleeding 0.035 0.004 0.032 0.002  
Breathing Problem 0.138 0.004 0.081 0.007  
Change in responsiveness 0.158 0.008 0.079 0.010  
Malaise 0.009 <0.001 0.015 0.005  
Mental/Psych 0.027 0.003 0.051 0.008  
Nausea/Vomiting 0.028 0.002 0.025 0.004  
None 0.017 0.001 0.034 0.014  
Pain 0.321 0.020 0.210 0.020  
Weakness 0.122 0.023 0.051 0.007  
Other 0.056 0.023 0.032 0.003  
Not known/not available 0.089 0.013 0.392 0.057  
Cardiac arrest indicator     0.104 
   No cardiac arrest 0.967 0.007 0.945 0.012  
   Cardiac arrest prior to 
EMS arrival 0.006 0.001 0.010 0.001  
   Cardiac arrest following 
EMS arrival 0.004 <0.001 0.002 0.000  
    Not known/not available 0.023 0.007 0.042 0.012  
Incident location type      
Home/residence 0.529 0.056 0.529 0.018 <0.001 
Street or highway 0.167 0.016 0.097 0.008  
Public building 0.025 0.002 0.045 0.005  
Trade or service 0.109 0.043 0.049 0.007  
Healthcare facility 0.077 0.007 0.044 0.006  
Residential institution 0.021 0.002 0.060 0.008  
Other location 0.048 0.001 0.038 0.004  
Not known/not available 0.024 0.010 0.137 0.020  
Num. Patients at scene     0.825 
    Single 0.975 0.008 0.978 0.005  
    Multiple 0.014 0.001 0.012 0.002  
    Not known/not available 0.011 0.008 0.010 0.004  
Reason for choosing 
destination     <0.001 
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    Closest facility (none 
below) 0.736 0.006 0.390 0.079  
    Family choice 0.010 0.002 0.081 0.014  
    Patient choice 0.050 0.004 0.379 0.053  
    Protocol  0.142 0.008 0.010 0.002  
    Other 0.060 0.006 0.085 0.016  
    Not known/not available 0.002 0.002 0.055 0.014  
a Data are expressed as mean proportion unless 




   




Table 6. Difference-in-differences coefficient estimates (CE) among adult EMS activations. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Pooled Post Post Year Trend 
Post Trend 2013/2016 
Volume 
 CE (p-value) CE (p-value) CE    (p-value) 
Treatment 1.48 (0.210) 1.49 (0.208) 1.10 (0.356) 
Post 0.63 (<0.001)                
Post*Treatment 0.26 (0.307)                
Post 1 year   0.46 (0.006) 0.31 (0.228) 
Post 2 year   0.65 (<0.001) 0.42 (0.123) 
Post 3 year   0.81 (0.002) 0.50 (0.154) 
Post 1 year*treatment   0.02 (0.905) 0.14 (0.599) 
Post 2 year*treatment   0.35 (0.205) 0.49 (0.161) 
Post 3 year*treatment   0.36 (0.347) 0.55 (0.219) 
n 3,783,258  3,783,258  3,783,258  
Notes: All models are inverse probability treatment weighted and controlled for EMS activation characteristics: 
age, sex, number of patients at scene, type of scene location, primary symptom, cardiac arrest, and reason for 





Table 7. Difference-in-differences coefficient estimates (CE) for adult EMS activations for adults who 
experienced cardiac arrest. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Pooled Post Post Year Trend 
Post Trend 2013/2016 
Volume 
 CE (p-value) CE (p-value) CE (p-value) 
Treatment 0.270 (0.775) 0.310 (0.744) 0.140 (0.883) 
Post -0.020 (0.899)     
Post*Treatment 0.410 (0.060)     
Post 1 year   -0.450 (0.021) -0.540 (0.048) 
Post 2 year   0.250 (0.174) 0.097 (0.772) 
Post 3 year   0.290 (0.182) 0.110 (0.760) 
Post 1 year*treatment   0.720 (0.018) 0.800 (0.022) 
Post 2 year*treatment   0.290 (0.428) 0.400 (0.324) 
Post 3 year*treatment   0.049 (0.882) 0.180 (0.677) 
n 42,291  42,291  42,291  
Notes: All models are inverse probability treatment weighted and controlled for EMS activation 
characteristics: age, sex, number of patients at scene, type of scene location, primary symptom, cardiac 
arrest, and reason for choosing destination. Model 3 also controlled for the 2013 proportion of 2016 EMS 
volume. 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
Overview and Context 
 The findings across the three aims of this dissertation provide evidence that there are unintended 
effects of the Maryland GBR program previously not considered. First, aims one and three demonstrated 
that rural residents and rural hospitals are differentially affected compared to their urban counterparts. 
Aim 1’s results found an association between the Maryland GBR program and probability of elective 
admission conditional on admission where patients with Medicaid insurance experienced an increased 
conditional probability of elective admission, and patients who were self-pay experienced a decrease in 
conditional probability of elective admission. However, this treatment effect was limited to urban residing 
patients with no change in conditional probability of elective admission among rural residents.  
 Aim 2 findings demonstrated similarly disparate results among rural hospitals compared to urban 
hospitals. Following implementation of the Maryland GBR program, rural and urban hospitals experienced 
opposite trends in transfers in from other acute care hospitals. Urban hospitals experienced an 
unexpected decline whereas rural hospitals experienced an unexpected increase in transfers in. Aim 2 
findings also demonstrated similar trends between rural and urban hospitals where there was an 
unexpected drop in the number of transfers out in the second year (calendar year 2015) following the 
policy’s implementation across both urban and rural hospitals. Similarly, average daily census was lower 
than expected across both urban and rural hospitals following policy implementation. The disparate 
transfers in trends along with a decline in transfers out across rural and urban hospitals provide some 
evidence that there may be a spillover effect of the Maryland GBR program for rural hospitals. These 
results suggest that hospitals that typically did not receive as many transfers in, rural hospitals, under the 
Maryland GBR program may have accommodated the demand not met by the decrease in transfers in 
among urban hospitals.  
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Second, Aim 1 demonstrated evidence of a dual Medicaid expansion and Maryland GBR policy 
effect. In examining the effect of the Maryland GBR program, this study controlled for the simultaneous 
expansion of Medicaid by selecting control hospitals from New York, a state that expanded Medicaid the 
same day as Maryland. Interestingly, a Maryland GBR program treatment effect was limited to the two 
payer groups expected to be most affected by Medicaid expansion. The Maryland GBR program was 
associated with an increase among Medicaid insurance group and a decrease among self-pay group in 
conditional probability of elective admission. These results provide support that global budgets may 
compliment Medicaid expansion if the goal is to improve access to elective services. If this outcome is 
indeed favorable, it is unfavorable that the dual treatment effect was limited to urban residing patients.  
 Thirdly, Aim 3 found some evidence that the Maryland GBR program is associated with longer EMS 
transport times among patients experiencing cardiac arrest, though caution should be used in interpreting 
these results due to the results’ sensitivity to changes in EMS agencies’ reporting. Better data is needed 
to isolate the effect of the Maryland GBR program from EMS agencies’ reporting patterns.  
 Finally, a notable finding in Aim 2 was that trends in transfers in went in an unintended direction for 
Maryland’s two AMCs. The unexpected decrease in transfers in among these two hospitals is a 
particularly important finding given that the HSCRC sought to incentivize transfers in for these two 
hospitals. The HSCRS updated transfer payments to incentives these two hospitals to accept transfers 
hoping to build on the incentive global budgets created for small or rural hospitals to no longer hold onto, 
but rather transfer, complex patients who could benefit from the higher level of care offered at the two 
AMCs. Further, Aim 2 results demonstrated that there was an absolute decrease in the number of staffed 
beds following policy implementation where percent occupancy increased among these two academic 
centers while percent occupancy decreased among other urban hospitals. These trends could indicate 
that there was a contraction in the supply of staffed beds among other urban hospitals that left the two 
AMCs accommodating the excess demand. 
 It is important to put these results into context. A significant motivation for this study was a 
substantial increase in the number of hours hospitals in Maryland (particularly in the urban areas) were on 
ambulance diversion status immediately following the implementation of the Maryland GBR program,27 
despite volume of emergency room visits remaining relatively flat.70 Additionally, one study provides 
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evidence of a decrease in the interhospital transfers for the first four years following the Maryland GBR 
program with no change among patients classified as major or extreme severity.39 This study makes the 
following contributions to the existing Maryland GBR program literature: better understanding of 
differential effects on rural patients and hospitals; better understanding of the hospital behavior that might 
have contributed to the increase in use ambulance diversion status (urban hospitals’ decrease in staffed 
beds); evidence of the potential effects of changes in hospitals’ behaviors (changes in conditional 
probability of elective admission); and a more detailed analysis of the decrease in interhospital transfers.   
Policy Implications 
Increased percent occupancy at Maryland’s two AMCs while other urban hospitals experienced a 
decrease in percent occupancy possibly suggests these two hospitals may be experiencing a spillover 
effect of the other urban hospitals contracting their capacity. Further, the two academic hospitals 
experienced higher percent occupancy and a decrease in transfers in from other acute care hospitals. 
These results could indicate that the increased demand created by contracted inpatient capacity at the 
other urban hospitals influenced the two AMCs’ ability to accept transfers. Policy intervention may be 
needed to limit the contracting of bed capacity or to protect capacity at the two AMCs.  
An additional policy concern is how changes in the mix of admissions—elective to non-elective 
admissions affects patients’ access to services. There are two particular concerns raised by the findings 
of this study. The first is a need to understand implications for patients’ access to services for an increase 
or decrease in the probability of elective admission. While an increase could represent improved access 
to elective services, does it come at the determent to those seeking non-elective services in settings 
where hospitals run close to full occupancy. In other words, is a bed assigned to an elective admission a 
bed taken from a potential non-elective admission. The second is the disparate effect of rural compared 
to urban residents where only the urban residents experienced a change in conditional probability of 
elective admission. As learned from previous policy interventions, it is critical to monitor for differential 
effects for rural residents to prevent further detrimental outcomes for an already vulnerable 
population.84,85 Second, an increase in the conditional probability of elective admission could represent 
another hospital behavior that limits access to emergency medical services, especially in the context of 
  
      61 
increased use of ambulance diversion and decreases in staffed beds among urban hospitals. Monitoring 
these hospital behaviors is critical to understanding implications for patients’ access to care.       
While global budgets may incentivize detrimental effects for access to inpatient beds in the urban 
setting where hospitals typically operate at higher occupancy levels, other settings such as rural hospitals 
may be guarded from such effects. Global budgets may be optimal in settings where hospitals 
consistently have lower percent occupancy where elective admissions and non-elective admissions would 
not compete for limited beds. Rural hospitals are once such setting where elective and non-electives are 
not likely to compete for limited inpatient beds. Thus, global budgets in rural settings may result in a 
greater benefits and fewer unintended results.  
Finally, Aim 3 provided limited evidence that the financial mechanisms of global budgets could 
negatively affect EMS transport times, though better data is needed to isolate the policy treatment effect. 
In the context of increased use of ambulance diversion and higher occupancy rates, EMS transport times 
may be an important measure to include in monitoring current and future implementations of global 
budgets in hospital settings. The evidence in the existing literature and the other two aims of this study 
provide indications of barriers to access to ED services that would support the need for further study of 
the association of the Maryland GBR program and EMS transport times. 
Future Directions 
 A future extension of this work that could provide insight into hospital behavior is a hospital-level 
comparison of transfers to transfer requests and an analysis of the types of patients that are being 
transferred in and out. Of particular interest is to understand if a decrease in transfers out (particularly in 
2015) was a result of fewer requests from the transferring hospital, or an increase in transfer denials 
preventing requests from being fulfilled. Similarly, understanding the decrease in transfers in among 
urban hospitals was result of fewer request for transfer or a reduction in the acceptance in transfer 
requests. This study would require hospitals to provide their transfer request data. An analysis by severity 
of illness or level of care requested would provide a better understand of the types of patients affected. 
Further insight could be gained from a qualitative study presenting interhospital transfers findings to 
hospital administrators and clinical leadership at transferring and receiving hospitals and asking their 
perspectives on challenges and strategies regarding interhospital transfers. 
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Another important extension of this work would be to provide a better understanding of the 
relationship between supply of beds and access to ED services. This would be a study that analyzed 
hospitals’ daily ambulance diversion hours and inpatient census before and after the Maryland GBR 
program. This study could identify if there is a relationship between inpatient census and ambulance 
diversion status and if the Maryland GBR program affected that relationship. Finally, another future study 
could use administrative payer data to assess changes in elective and non-elective admission rates. 
Payer data would provide helpful population denominators to analyze change in the probability (versus 
the conditional probability) of elective vs. non-elective admissions and better understand changes in 
admission mix among payer groups.  
While global budgets are an advancement towards population-based payment and offer a potential 
solution for stabilizing rural hospitals’ volatile revenues, there are potential concerns when eliminating the 
tie between volume and revenue. The results of this dissertation provide support for expanding the 
measures used to monitor the impact of global budgets for hospitals. If global budgets are to be continued 
in Maryland and expanded in other settings, it is critical to ensure that mechanisms are in place to guard 
against (1) deleterious effects for rural residents and rural hospitals and (2) introducing incentives for 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Selection and Weighting of Control Hospitals 
Given all Maryland treatment hospitals were located in metropolitan areas as defined as having a 
Rural-Urban Community Area (RUCA) code of one51 and were non-government not-for-profit hospitals, 
control hospitals were exact matched on rural and ownership status. New York hospitals in similar 
metropolitan areas with the same ownership type included 88 hospitals. 
After exact matching on rural status and ownership status, a logit model was used to estimate each 
hospital’s propensity score—the probability of being a Maryland hospital—conditional on observed 
baseline covariates thought to influence outcomes or treatment selection and outcomes.52,53 These 
covariates included: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), case mix index, percent Medicare days, number 
of beds, average daily census, Medicare disproportionate share hospital (DSH) adjustment, graduate 
medical education (GME) spending, median age of patients, proportion female patients, proportion white 
patients, and proportion rural patients. Hospitals in more competitive markets, (e.g., has a higher HHI) 
may be more likely to experience a change in probability of elective admission due to spill-over effects of 
hospitals in the same market also responding to the policy change. Hospitals with a higher case mix 
index, higher percent of Medicare days, and/or higher disproportionate share adjustment may be more 
likely to be safety net hospitals or tertiary or quaternary care hospitals that provide sub-specialty services 
and be less likely to experience a change in probability of elective admission. Number of beds and 
average daily census are measures of hospital size and capacity, which may have a differential effect on 
hospitals’ use of changing mix of inpatient admissions. GME spending is a measure of hospitals’ teaching 
status defined categorically as having no GME spending, or by quartile of state GME spending in the 
state. Hospitals with teaching programs, particularly those with large teaching programs, could be less 
likely to reduce elective admissions in order to maintain a patient case mix required for teaching 
purposes. Patient population characteristics were included because different patient populations can be 
associated with differing probability of elective admission. Estimated propensity scores were then used to 
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Defining Measures 
The HHI Index was calculated as the sum of squared hospital shares of inpatient admissions for all 
hospitals in a given county using the Maryland and New York HCUP SIDs.86 A hospital’s case mix index, 
percent Medicare days, number of beds, average daily census, and DSH adjustment were taken from 
CMS Impact Files. GME spending was defined as a five-level measure with the first level being zero GME 
spending, and the subsequent four levels quartile measure of GME spending as provided by CMS cost 
reports. Median age, proportion female, proportion white, and proportion rural patients were calculated 
using data from the HCUP SIDs. Patients’ rural status was defined using the US Office of Budget’s 
definition that dichotomizes the three-level Core Based Statistical Areas measure classifying areas that 
are neither a metropolitan or micropolitan area as rural.87 
Inverse Probability of Treatment Weight (IPTW) Calculation and Balancing Diagnostics 
IPTWs were calculated to estimate the average treatment effect among the treated. Treatment 
hospitals were given a weight of one and control hospitals a weight of  where e is an observation’s 
propensity score.79 To assess the balance of baseline covariates, standardized mean differences 
between weighted treated and control groups were calculated. A standardized mean difference less than 
10-20% is considered by some authors as indicative of achieving sufficient balance.53,80 The standardized 
mean difference in baseline covariates in the weighted sample was 6.7%. The baseline characteristics 
that exceeded standardized mean difference of 10 percent were case mix index (12.8 percent) and 
percent Medicare days (17.9 percent) (Figure5). IPTWs ranged from .00008 to 3.42 with all treatment 
hospitals assigned a weight of one. All baseline hospital characteristics were included in fully specified 
models for duly robust model estimation.  
Testing Parallel Trends Assumption and Assessment of Out-Of-Range Predictions  
A falsification test was conducted running the outcome models in the pre-period with an artificial post 
period to be able to test the null hypothesis that there was not a difference in the baseline outcome trend 
between the treatment and control groups. The pre-period was defined as 2012 and the artificial post 
period was defined as 2013. The falsification test of estimating the treatment effect in the pre-period, 
returned a non-significant treatment coefficient 0.0036 (95% CI, -.011 to .019, P =.64). These results 
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indicate a failure to reject the null hypothesis that there was a difference between treatment and control 
group pre-period outcome trends.  
All outcome model results were assessed for out-of-range predictions (e.g., predicted probabilities of 
>1 or <0) to determine if logit models should be used as an alternative to estimate conditional 
probabilities. Among all models, out-of-range predictions were less than one percent where some models 
had predicted probabilities less than zero, so it was determined estimation with logit models was not 
needed.  
Outcome Model Specification Robustness Checks 
Three model specifications were used to examine robustness to inclusion of variables used in 
estimating propensity scores. All models were estimated with indicators for post 1-year, post 2-year, and 
post 3-year and an interaction of the treatment indicator with each post year. The first model included only 
these before mentioned covariates. The second specification of the model added time-varying hospital-
level admission characteristics: mean age, proportion female, proportion white, proportion rural residing. 
A third, fully specified model included the admission characteristics and baseline hospital characteristics: 
quartiles of GME spending, average daily census, case mix index, percent Medicare days, and county 
HHI. Models were weighted using IPTWs and estimated with robust standard errors clustered at the 
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Tables and Figures 
 
APPENDIX A FIGURE 1. Study sample selection flow chart. 
 
APPENDIX A TABLE 1. Hospital characteristics and data sources. 
Variable Year Source 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (at the county 
level) 
2013 
Calculated from SID at 
the county level 
Case Mix Index 2013 CMS Impact File 
Percent Medicare days 2013 CMS Impact File 
Disproportionate share 
(DSH) adjustments 
2013 CMS Impact File 
RUCA  2019 
Cecil G. Sheps Center 
for Health Services 
Research 
Ownership type 2013 AHA Survey 
Teaching status 2010 CMS cost reports 
Number of beds 2013 CMS Impact File 
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APPENDIX A TABLE 2. Maryland hospitals included in the study. 
CMS Provider 
Number(s) Hospital Name 
210002 
University of Maryland Medical 
Center 
210003 Prince George's Hospital Center 
210004 Holy Cross Hospital 
210005 Frederick Memorial Hospital 
210006 Harford Memorial Hospital 
210008 Mercy Medical Center 
210009 Johns Hopkins Hospital 
210011 St. Agnes Hospital 
210012 Sinai Hospital of Baltimore 
210013 Bon Secours Baltimore Health Sys 
210015 Franklin Square Hospital Center 
210016 Washington Adventist Hospital 
210018 Montgomery General Hospital 
210019 Peninsula Regional Health System 
210022 Suburban Hospital 
210023 Anne Arundel Medical Center 
210024 Union Memorial Hospital 
210029 
Johns Hopkins Bayview Medical 
Center 
210034 Harbor Hospital 
210038 Maryland General Hospital 
210040 Northwest Hospital 
210043 
Baltimore Washington Medical 
Center 
210044 Greater Baltimore Medical Center 
210048 Howard County General Hospital 
210049 Upper Chesapeake Medical Center 
210051 Doctors Community Hospital 
210055 Laurel Regional Hospital 
210056 Good Samaritan Hosp of Maryland 
210057 Shady Grove Adventist Hospital 
210060 Fort Washington Medical Center 
210007 & 210063 St. Joseph Medical Center 
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APPENDIX A FIGURE 2. Inverse probability of treatment weighted trend of probability of elective 
admission for >2 day inpatient stays. 
 
Error bars represent 95% Confidence intervals. 
 
APPENDIX A FIGURE 3. Standardized percent bias across covariates for unweighted and inverse 
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APPENDIX A TABLE 3. Linear probability model coefficient estimates (CE) for conditional probability of 
elective admission. 





value) CE (p-value) 
Maryland -0.087 (0.020) -0.085 (0.035) -0.097 (0.006) 
Post year 1 0.010 (0.051) 0.007 (0.159) 0.007 (0.247) 
Post year 2 0.007 (0.407) 0.006 (0.505) 0.006 (0.571) 
Post year 3 0.004 (0.692) 0.003 (0.673) 0.004 (0.648) 
Post year 1 * 
treatment -0.008 (0.340) -0.005 (0.587) -0.011 (0.230) 
Post year 2 * 
treatment -0.008 (0.489) -0.003 (0.769) -0.004 (0.750) 
Post year 3 * 
treatment 0.006 (0.678) 0.009 (0.470) 0.009 (0.508) 
n 9,406,864  9,406,864  9,406,864  
Notes: all models are inverse probability of treatment weighted. Model 1 included indicators for 
treatment, post year 1, post year 2, post year 3, and interaction terms post year 1*treatment, post 
year 2* treatment and post year 3 * treatment. Model 2 included terms from Model 1 in addition to 
time varying admission characteristics: age, female, race and rural residence status. Model 3 
included terms from model 2 in addition to baseline hospital characteristics: GME spending 
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APPENDIX A TABLE 4. Linear probability model coefficient estimates (CE) for conditional 
probability of elective admission for admissions with length of stay greater than two days. 








Maryland -0.086 (0.038) -0.084 (0.056) -0.098 (0.006) 
       
Post year 1 0.008 (0.105) 0.005 (0.278) 0.005 (0.392) 
       
Post year 2 0.002 (0.836) 0.000058 (0.995) -0.0002 (0.985) 
       
Post year 3 -0.007 (0.436) -0.009 (0.276) -0.008 (0.423) 
       
Post year 1 * treatment -0.015 (0.059) -0.012 (0.140) -0.019 (0.037) 
       
Post year 2 * treatment -0.015 (0.190) -0.009 (0.407) -0.010 (0.362) 
       
Post year 3 * treatment 0.004  (0.777) 0.010  (0.463) 0.009 (0.532) 
n 6,038,768  6,038,768  6,038,768  
Notes: all models are inverse probability of treatment weighted. Model 1 included indicators for 
treatment, post year 1, post year 2, post year 3, and interaction terms post year 1*treatment, 
post year 2* treatment and post year 3 * treatment. Model 2 included terms from Model 1 in 
addition to time varying admission characteristics: age, female, race and rural residence status. 
Model 3 included terms from model 2 in addition to baseline hospital characteristics: GME 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Estimating Baseline Trends 
The pre-period trends in transfers in and transfers out were estimated to show proportional change. 
Trends were estimated using generalized linear models (GLM). A comparison of proportional change was 
used due to values among rural hospitals compared to urban hospitals being on a much smaller scale. 
Proportional change offers a more meaningful comparison than unit change when comparing change on 
different scales. Separate trends were estimated for rural and urban hospitals using equation A, where 
the estimated log(Y) is estimated using indicators for whether an observation is categorized as urban pre-
period, urban post-period, rural pre-period, or rural post-period and the interaction of these four indicators 
with the year associated with the observation.  
Equation A: ln(𝐸[𝑌]) =  𝛽 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 +  𝛽 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 +
 𝛽 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝛽 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝛽 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝛽 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝜀 
Similarly, pre-period trends in average daily census (ADC) were estimated but instead using ordinary 
least square models to show level change given the same scale of ADC between urban and rural 
hospitals. Equation B shows the linear model.  
Equation B: 𝐸[𝑌] =  𝛽 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 +  𝛽 𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 +  𝛽 𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 +
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APPENDIX C 
 
Selecting Health Service Areas (HSAs)  
HSAs can change year to year due to changes in Medicare market area shifts. ZIP codes are 
assigned to an HSA based on where the greatest proportion of Medicare residents were hospitalized in a 
given year.73 Most HSAs contain one hospital, though some contain several hospitals. The composition of 
ZIP codes in HSAs can change year to year due to changes in Medicare market area shifts. This study 
uses time invariant HSAs (HSAs from a baseline year prior to implementation) under the assumption that 
the Maryland GBR program could influence changes in HSAs. Although, visual inspection of HSAs 
reveals little change in Maryland over the treatment period (2012-2016). The base line year of 2010 was 
chosen because that is the year from which a County-to-ZIP HAS crosswalk with population allocation 
factors was available from the MCDC. To select Maryland HSAs, I started with the HSA hospital file from 
Dartmouth Atlas files and identified the 33 2014 Maryland GBR program treatment hospitals10 and 
identified an HSA as a treatment HSA if it contained a treatment hospital. Fort Washington Medical 
Center was excluded because its HSA was in DC. The final treatment group included 33 hospitals within 
18 HSAs, which includes one hospital, Atlantic General Hospital which did not implement global budgets 
in 2014. APPENDIX C TABLE 1 provides all treatment hospitals and HSAs. To select the control HSAs, I 
limited the HSA hospital file to HSAs that were within the eight control states. 
In addition to Maryland, 18 states expanded Medicaid on January 1, 2014.78 This excluded any 
states that expanded in ways not otherwise allowed under federal law. Selection of states was limited to 
states that were non-bordering states in the Northeast region or may have other urban areas similar to 
Maryland (e.g., Chicago in Illinois). The final eight states the comparator sample included: Connecticut, 
Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. 
HSA-Level Measure Creation 
This study used the MCDC crosswalk to map counties to HSAs and the MCDC allocation factors to 
calculate HSA-level measures from county-level measures. For example, the number of short-term 
hospitals in a county were multiplied by the county to HSA allocation factor and summed by HSA to 
determine total number of short-term hospitals in a given HSA. All measures were coarsened to quantiles 
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to preserve geographic anonymity in the NEMSIS data. The Dartmouth Atlas hospital-to-HSA crosswalk 
allowed for the identification of treatment HSAs and the Dartmouth Atlas ZIP-code-to-HSA crosswalk 
linked NEMSIS outcome data to the HSA-level measurements.  
To calculate the number of general hospital emergency department visits at the HSA-level I used the 
number of general hospital emergency department visits at the county level from the AHRF and multiplied 
the county values by the county-to-HSA allocation factor and summed the values at the HAS-level. The 
same method was used to calculate the number of inpatient beds, number of inpatient days, and number 
of hospitals at the HSA-level. The percent inpatient occupancy was calculated by first calculating the total 
inpatient bed days available at the HSA-level multiplying the number of hospital beds in the HSA by 365 
and then dividing the total inpatient bed days divided by the total available hospital bed days. Two HSA-
level demographic measures, percent below poverty level and percent white, were calculated by 
multiplying the AHRQ county-level measures and the county-to-HSA allocation factor then summing the 
values at the HSA-level. All HSA-level measures were coarsened to quantiles to preserve geographic 
anonymity of the data. 
Estimating Propensity Scores and Calculating Inverse Probability of Treatment Weights 
An advantage of using propensity score estimation methods is that it allows for the design of the 
study (e.g., creating a control group) to be separate from the analysis of the effect of the treatment on the 
outcome.79 The propensity score is the probability of a subject receiving the treatment, in this case the 
probability of a hospital being in a Maryland treatment HSA, conditional on their observed baseline 
covariates.88 This study used a weighting methodology using the propensity scores as opposed to a 
matching technique to be able to include all treated Maryland HSAs in the study sample. Each HSA’s 
inverse probability of treatment weight is defined as the inverse probability of receiving the treatment that 
the subject received. The inverse of the probability of treatment weight is calculated: 𝑊 = 𝑍 +
( )
. 
Where 𝑒 is the estimated propensity score and 𝑍 denotes treatment assignment.  
o For treatment HSAs the equation simplifies to 1/ 𝑒 
o For control HSAs the equation simplifies to 1/(1- 𝑒) 
Since the focus of this study was to determine the average treatment effect among Maryland GBR 
program HSAs as opposed to the average treatment effect at the population level, this study used the 
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average treatment on the treated weights achieved by multiplying the conventional weights by the 
propensity score, so that treated subjects receive a weight of one.  
o For treatment HSAs IPTW weights equal 1 
o For control HSAs the equation simplifies to 𝑒/(1- 𝑒) 
Propensity score models were estimated using variables thought to influence the outcome or 
treatment selection and the outcome.52 One of these variables was rural status of the 9-1-1 call incident. 
Due to the fact there was no variation among Maryland treatment HSAs rural status HSAs were exact 
matched on rural status prior to estimating propensity score models. Rurality at the county-level was 
defined by dichotomizing rural-urban continuum codes (RUCC) where rural counties were counties with a 
RUCC 1 to 3 and counties with a RUCC 4-9 classified as not-rural.51 Rural status at the HSA-level was 
defined as a percent of the HSA population that lived in rural areas. All Maryland treatment HSAs had no 
rural residents.  
The variables included in the propensity score model were measures of the 9-1-1 call incident HSAs 
from the baseline year of 2010 including: quantile of the number of short-term general hospitals per 
10,000 population, quartile of the number of general short-term hospital emergency department visits, 
quartile of percent inpatient occupancy, quartile of percent white population, and tertile of percent of 
population living below the poverty level. Additional variables of healthcare supply were considered but 
excluded due to their multi-collinearity.  
A logit model was used to estimate the probability of treatment assignment, in this study whether an 
HSA was a Maryland HSA. Propensity scores were used to calculate IPTW for use to estimate the 
average treatment among the treated as mentioned above. Balancing diagnostics were conducted to 
assess whether the distribution of measured baseline covariates was similar between weighted treatment 
and control hospitals and to test the positivity assumption validity. Standardized differences provided 
comparisons of means and proportions of baseline covariates—a method of comparison that is not 
influenced by sample size. I also examined the distribution of the IPTW and determined the mean IPTW 
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Where 𝑤  is the weight assigned to an individual HSA and 𝑥  is the value of the baseline covariate for 
continuous variables.  
Tables and Figures 
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APPENDIX C FIGURE 2. Standardized percent bias across covariates for unweighted and inverse 
probability of treatment (IPT) weighted sample. 
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APPENDIX C TABLE 1. Maryland hospitals within 18 treatment hospital service areas (HSAs). 
Hospital 
ID 
Hospital Hospital City Hospital 
State 




210023 Anne Arundel Medical Center Annapolis MD 21001 Annapolis MD 1 
210013 Bon Secours Baltimore Health 
Sys 
Baltimore MD 21002 Baltimore MD 1 
210015 Franklin Square Hospital 
Center 
Baltimore MD 21002 Baltimore MD 1 
210056 Good Samaritan Hosp of 
Maryland 
Baltimore MD 21002 Baltimore MD 1 
210044 Greater Baltimore Medical 
Center 
Baltimore MD 21002 Baltimore MD 1 
210034 Harbor Hospital Baltimore MD 21002 Baltimore MD 1 
210029 Johns Hopkins Bayview 
Medical Center 
Baltimore MD 21002 Baltimore MD 1 
210009 Johns Hopkins Hospital Baltimore MD 21002 Baltimore MD 1 
210058 Kernan Orthos and 
Rehabilitation 
Baltimore MD 21002 Baltimore MD 1 
210038 Maryland General Hospital Baltimore MD 21002 Baltimore MD 1 
210008 Mercy Medical Center Baltimore MD 21002 Baltimore MD 1 
210012 Sinai Hospital of Baltimore Baltimore MD 21002 Baltimore MD 1 
210011 St. Agnes Hospital Baltimore MD 21002 Baltimore MD 1 
210007 St. Joseph Medical Center Towson MD 21002 Baltimore MD 1 
210024 Union Memorial Hospital Baltimore MD 21002 Baltimore MD 1 
210002 University of Maryland Medical 
Center 
Baltimore MD 21002 Baltimore MD 1 
210022 Suburban Hospital Bethesda MD 21003 Bethesda MD 1 
210003 Prince George's Hospital 
Center 
Cheverly MD 21006 Cheverly MD 1 
210054 Southern Maryland Hosp 
Center 
Clinton MD 21007 Clinton MD 1 
210048 Howard County General 
Hospital 
Columbia MD 21008 Columbia MD 1 
210049 Upper Chesapeake Medical 
Center 





210005 Frederick Memorial Hospital Frederick MD 21014 Frederick MD 1 
210043 Baltimore Washington Medical 
Center 
Glen Burnie MD 21016 Glen Burnie MD 1 
210006 Harford Memorial Hospital Havre de 
Grace 
MD 21018 Havre De 
Grace 
MD 1 
210051 Doctors Community Hospital Lanham MD 21020 Lanham MD 1 
210055 Laurel Regional Hospital Laurel MD 21021 Laurel MD 1 
210018 Montgomery General Hospital Olney MD 21024 Olney MD 1 
210040 Northwest Hospital Randallstown MD 21026 Randallstown MD 1 
210057 Shady Grove Adventist 
Hospital 
Rockville MD 21028 Rockville MD 1 
210061 Atlantic General Hospital Berlin MD 21029 Salisbury MD 0 
210019 Peninsula Regional Health 
System 
Salisbury MD 21029 Salisbury MD 1 
210004 Holy Cross Hospital Silver Spring MD 21030 Silver Spring MD 1 
210016 Washington Adventist Hospital Takoma Park MD 21031 Takoma Park MD 1 
NOTE: Fort Washington Medical Center was excluded because its HSA was in Washington DC.  
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APPENDIX C TABLE 2. Difference-in-differences coefficient estimates (CE) among adult EMS 
activations limited to HSAs where 2013 HSA EMS activation volume was at least fifty percent of 2016 
HSA EMS activation volume. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 




 CE (p-value) CE (p-value) CE 
(p-
value) 
Treatment 1.760 (0.123) 1.770 (0.122) 1.350 (0.300) 
Post 0.510 (0.002)     
Post*Treatment 0.260 (0.288)     
Post 1 year   0.440 (0.001) 0.410 (0.002) 
Post 2 year   0.480 (0.012) 0.430 (0.025) 
Post 3 year   0.610 (0.008) 0.470 (0.054) 
Post 1 year*treatment   0.037 (0.813) 0.050 (0.763) 
Post 2 year*treatment   0.350 (0.227) 0.370 (0.220) 
Post 3 year*treatment   0.370 (0.258) 0.480 (0.199) 
Age 0.016 (<0.001) 0.016 (<0.001) 0.016 (<0.001) 
Sex       
Male ref  ref  ref  
Female 0.080 (0.101) 0.084 (0.092) 0.078 (0.100) 
Not known/not available 0.450 (0.104) 0.450 (0.105) 0.540 (0.056) 
Number of patients at scene       
Single ref  ref  ref  
Multiple 1.470 (<0.001) 1.460 0.000  1.470 (<0.001) 
Not known/not available 1.800 (0.017) 1.830 (0.014) 1.730 (0.014) 
Type of scene location       
Home/residence       




0.670 0.000  





Trade or service 0.039 (0.878) 0.050 (0.844) 
-
0.017 (0.941) 















Not known/not available 0.041 (0.863) 0.072 (0.765) 0.030 (0.904) 
Primary symptom       
Bleeding ref  ref  ref  
Breathing Problem -0.540 (<0.001) 
-
0.540 0.000  
-
0.560 (<0.001) 

















Nausea/vomiting 0.027 (0.825) 0.028 (0.821) 0.038 (0.754) 





Pain 0.370 (<0.001) 0.370 (<0.001) 0.350 (<0.001) 
Weakness 0.065 (0.697) 0.064 (0.700) 0.032 (0.831) 
Other 0.690 (0.003) 0.690 (0.003) 0.620 (0.002) 





Cardiac Arrest       
No ref  ref  ref  





Yes, after EMS arrival 0.220 (0.096) 0.220 (0.094) 0.220 (0.096) 





Reason for choosing destination       
Closest facility (none below) ref  ref  ref  
Family choice 4.630 (<0.001) 4.630 (<0.001) 4.610 (<0.001) 
Patient choice 3.380 (<0.001) 3.380 (<0.001) 3.390 (<0.001) 
Protocol 1.750 (<0.001) 1.730 (<0.001) 1.730 (<0.001) 
Other 4.650 (<0.001) 4.640 (<0.001) 4.640 (<0.001) 
Not known/not available 3.400 (<0.001) 3.390 (<0.001) 3.430 (<0.001) 
2013 proportion of 2016 EMS volume     
-
1.230 (0.252) 
Constant 5.930 (<0.001) 5.910 (<0.001) 7.420 (<0.001) 




APPENDIX C TABLE 3. Difference-in-differences coefficient estimates (CE) among EMS activations for 
adults who experienced cardiac arrest limited to HSAs where 2013 HSA EMS activation volume was at 
least fifty percent of 2016 HSA EMS activation volume. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Pooled Post Post Year Trend 
Post Trend 
2013/2016 Volume 
 CE (p-value) CE (p-value) CE (p-value) 
Treatment 0.820 (0.348) 0.830 (0.342) 0.580 (0.545) 
Post 0.200 (0.142)                
Post*Treatment 0.140 (0.506)                
Post 1 year   -0.170 (0.314) -0.210 (0.221) 
Post 2 year   0.320 (0.088) 0.250 (0.209) 
Post 3 year   0.550 0.000  0.430 (0.015) 
Post 1 year*treatment   0.510 (0.086) 0.530 (0.070) 
Post 2 year*treatment   0.150 (0.691) 0.210 (0.567) 
Post 3 year*treatment   -0.350 (0.232) -0.230 (0.464) 
Age 0.014 (0.002) 0.014 (0.002) 0.014 (0.002) 
Sex       
Male ref  ref  ref  
Female -0.290 (0.004) -0.300 (0.003) -0.300 (0.003) 
Not known/not available -0.070 (0.934) -0.120 (0.895) -0.130 (0.884) 
Number of patients at scene       
Single ref  ref  ref  
Multiple 0.290 (0.764) 0.280 (0.767) 0.300 (0.755) 
Not known/not available 0.770 (0.549) 0.710 (0.573) 0.900 (0.460) 
Type of scene location       
Home/residence ref  ref  ref  
Street or highway -0.950 (<0.001) -0.960 (<0.001) -0.960 (<0.001) 
Public building -0.900 (0.023) -0.910 (0.023) -0.860 (0.029) 
Trade or service 0.350 (0.306) 0.350 (0.297) 0.320 (0.332) 
Healthcare facility -1.420 0.000  -1.440 (<0.001) -1.440 (<0.001) 
Residential institution -0.890 (0.005) -0.880 (0.005) -0.880 (0.004) 
Other -0.120 (0.599) -0.140 (0.559) -0.130 (0.564) 
Not known/not available 0.210 (0.465) 0.200 (0.478) 0.190 (0.504) 
Primary symptom       
Bleeding ref  ref  ref  
Breathing Problem 0.790 (0.063) 0.780 (0.062) 0.740 (0.070) 
Change in responsiveness -0.034 (0.930) -0.042 (0.912) -0.067 (0.858) 
Malaise 0.610 (0.676) 0.540 (0.706) 0.430 (0.767) 
Mental/psych 1.320 (0.128) 1.340 (0.115) 1.410 (0.078) 
Nausea/vomiting 4.020 (<0.001) 3.980 (<0.001) 4.000 (<0.001) 
None -0.620 (0.408) -0.600 (0.420) -0.710 (0.338) 
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Pain 2.420 0.000  2.410 0.000  2.370 0.000  
Weakness 1.000 (0.155) 0.980 (0.166) 0.930 (0.182) 
Other 1.770 (0.002) 1.760 (0.002) 1.600 (0.002) 
Not known/not available 0.580 (0.191) 0.580 (0.176) 0.610 (0.150) 
Cardiac Arrest       
Yes, prior to EMS arrival ref  ref  ref  
Yes, after EMS arrival 0.580 (0.002) 0.580 (0.001) 0.580 (0.001) 
Reason for choosing destination       
Closest facility (none below) ref  ref  ref  
Family choice 2.290 (<0.001) 2.330 (<0.001) 2.530 (<0.001) 
Patient choice 1.930 (<0.001) 1.950 (<0.001) 2.030 (<0.001) 
Protocol 0.810 (0.276) 0.810 (0.276) 0.810 (0.271) 
Other 3.110 (<0.001) 3.090 (<0.001) 3.140 (<0.001) 
Not known/not available 1.510 (0.013) 1.470 (0.011) 1.430 (0.021) 
2013 proportion of 2016 EMS volume     -0.740 (0.377) 
Constant 6.280 (<0.001) 6.280 (<0.001) 7.210 (<0.001) 
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